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Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT -. < H. KT
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
UTAHNS FOR BETTER DENTAL HEALTH
DAVIS, INC., a Utah Nonprofit Corporation,
RULING
Plaintiff,

:

vs

:

DAVIS COUNTY COMMISSION,
Commissioner Dan R. McConkie,
Commissioner Carol R. Page,
Commissioner Michael J. Cragun;
DAVIS COUNTY CLERK,
Steve S. Rawlings,

:

Defendants.

:
:
:
:
:
:

Civil No.: 020801343
Judge Glen R. Dawson

Plaintiff brings this action for declaratory judgment pursuant to Rule S7 nl ihe Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure and Chapter 33 of Title 78 of the Utah Code and for injunctive relief pursuant
to Rule 65 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff requests this ('< >ui I to make a
determination regarding the constitutional \\ • fand the application ofUtah Code Ann. §§ l r M-

111 and ?0A- 7 nO 1 et seq. to defendants' decision to certify and place an "Initiative Pet^1
the 2002 general election ballot in Davis (Viml v 1'he Initiative Petition at issue in this case
requests a re-vote on a fluoridation opinion question that was previously submitted to and,
approved by voters in l \ i \ M , ,nn 11. the general election held on November 7, 2000. Plaintiff
also seeks to have this Court restrain and enjoin the Davis (' • -«11if y ( i u k and the Davis County
Commissioners fi uin placing the Initiative Petition on the 2002 general election ballot in Davis
County.
On August 23, 2002, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for lack, of standing and
requested the Court to dismiss defendant Conwy Commissioners Dan R. McConkie, Carol R.
Page and Michael J. Cragun from the lawsuit on the basis that the Commissio IMS \\U >l » «olein
placing the Petition on the ballot I \ :ft ndants also moved the Court to order that a trial of the
action on the merits be consolidated with the plaintiffs motion it n pu luminal v Injunction.
On September 1 I ,"(K »2 JI ie above-entitled action was scheduled for a consolidated
hearing on the merits. David R. Irvine, Janet I. Jenson and A udir iv \\ tttavros appeared on
behalf of the plaint if t ! luci ( ivil Deputy County Attorney Gerald E. Hess appeared on behalf
of the defendants. Prior to the hearing, the parties si-binn u cf memoranda in support of their
respective positions. Upon completion of the hearing, the Court decided to further < un^ in <»
arguments of the parties and withhold its dmsioh « » (he merits until September 16, 2002,
wherein the matter was deemed fully submitted to the Court for disposition,., entry of findings of
fact and conclusions of law and final itnlfiiH, nl
Having fully considered and weighed the record and submit ions, together with the
arguments oi counsel, ;uui lor f outt cause appearing, the Court now enters this Ruling, to be
made final upon the Court's further decision on plaintiffs molit m for attorneys' fees and costs as
discussed in l he Ordering section of this Ruling:
2

FACTUAL FINDINGS
1.

In accordance with the authority granted pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 19-4-111

(1) (c), the Davis County Commission ("Commission"), on July 26, 2000, adopted a resolution to
place an opinion question relating to thefluoridationof all public water systems within Davis
County on the 2000 general election ballot. An amendment to that resolution was adopted by the
Commission on September 11, 2000. The question, as it appeared on the November 7, 2000
general election ballot, was: "Shouldfluoride be added to the public water supplies within Davis
CountyT
2.

In the general election held on November 7, 2000, the voters of Davis County

approved the addition of fluoride to the public water supplies within the county by a vote of
44,403 in favor to 40,950 opposed. Of the 85,353 voters who responded to that ballot question,
52% favored fluoridation; 48% opposed fluoridation.
3.

On November 13, 2000, the duly constituted Board of Canvass certified the

election results for the November 7, 2000 general election in Davis County.
4.

As mandated by the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 19-4-111(2), on April 5,

2001, the Davis County Health Department issued its order to operators of public water systems
directing that such operators add fluoride to those systems on or before May 1, 2002.
5.

Based on that order, water system operators in Davis County have been preparing

to add fluoride in accordance therewith. To date, fluoride is in the water of approximately 25%
of county residents. The Health Department has directed that remaining system operators be in
full compliance not later than November 1, 2002.

6.

On May 8,2001, a group of Davis County citizens filed an application, pursuant

to Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-502, with defendant Davis County Clerk ("Clerk") to circulate an
initiative petition ("Initiative Petition") which they titled "Re-vote on Mandatory Fluoridation
Acf requesting a "Repeal of prior action? that a re-vote on fluoridation be held, and that county
voters again be asked the question, "Shouldfluoride be added to the public water supplies within
Davis County?"
7.

Thereafter, the sponsors began circulating the Initiative Petition to registered

voters within Davis County. In their initiative petition, the sponsors requested that it be
submitted to the Davis County Commission for its approval or rejection at its next meeting, or to
the legal voters of Davis County in the 2002 general election if the County Commission rejected
the proposed law or took no action on it.
8.

After verifying the requisite number of signatures for a local initiative petition

pursuant to the local initiative petition statute, Utah Code § 20A-7-501(2), defendant Clerk
submitted the Initiative Petition to the Commission on July 9, 2002, for the Commission's further
action as provided in § 20A-7-501(3).
9.

At its next scheduled meeting on August 6,2002, the Commission took no action

on the petition, and the Clerk, upon the advice of legal counsel, stated that he would put the
petition question on the general election ballot as required by Utah Code § 20A-7-501(3)(d).
The facts set out above are undisputed.

ANALYSIS
I. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing.
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of standing. Under Utah law, a

"party has standing if any one of three criteria is met: (1) the interests of the parties are adverse,
and the party seeding relief has a legally protectible interest in the controversy; (2) no one has a
greater interest than that party and the issue is unlikely to be raised at all if standing is denied; or
(3) the issues raised by the party are of great public importance and ought to be judicially
resolved " State Ex Rel. M. W.. 12 P.3d 80, 83 (Utah 2000) (citing Kennecott Corp. v. Salt Lake
County. 702 P.2d 451,454 (Utah 1985) (citing Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145,1150-51 (Utah
1983)). The Courtfindsthat all three of these criteria have been independently satisfied by
plaintiff.
The Courtfindsthat plaintiff is a nonprofit corporation organized specifically to advocate
the benefits offluoridationin Davis County, and as stated in the affidavit of Beth Q. Beck,
Ed.D., who was one of the original incorporators of plaintiff, that it was significantly involved in
the 2000 county-wide vote on this issue; many of plaintiff's members are residents of Davis
County. The Courtfindsthat many members of the Davis County Board of Health and five
Chairs of the Board of Health from 1998 through the end of 2000 were instrumental in forming
and directing the activities of plaintiff, and that plaintiff was significantly involved in obtaining
the legislative changes which enabled the Davis County Commission to place the fluoridation
question on the 2000 ballot. The Court alsofindsthat the Davis County Board of Health adopted
a recommendation to pursue waterfluoridationas a public health measure in 1998, and that
members of the Board, in their private capacities, and others incorporated plaintiff in 1999 to
promote the public acceptance of water fluoridation and to support thefluoridationpolicies of
the Board as a community-based organization outside of and beyond the Board itself. If a legally
insufficient petition to re-votefluoridationwere placed on the 2002 ballot, the due process rights
of plaintiff's members would be violated. The Courtfindsthese facts sufficient to confer upon

plaintiff a unique and legally protectible interest in the controversy before the Court.
Additionally, the Courtfindsthat no party is likely to have a greater interest in this lawsuit than
plaintiff, and the claims asserted by plaintiff do not make individual participation by plaintiffs
members indispensable to a resolution of this lawsuit. Finally, the Court finds that the issues
presented by plaintiff are of great public importance to the general public, Davis County voters
and cities within Davis County who must implement fluoridation, and thus ought to be resolved
by this Court. Therefore, the Court denies defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint for lack
of standing.
II. Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss County Commissioners,
Defendants also moved to dismiss the defendant County Commissioners as parties to this
lawsuit. With respect to this issue, the Court is persuaded by the arguments contained in the
defendants' memorandum in support of their motion to dismiss. Specifically, the Commission
took no action concerning the Initiative Petition at issue in this case and had no role in placing
the Initiative Petition on the ballot. Section 20A-7-501(d) requires the County Clerk, not the
Commission, to submit the Initiative Petition to Davis County voters at the next general election.
As such, the Commissioners are not proper parties to this lawsuit. Accordingly, the Court grants
defendants' motion to dismiss the Commissioners.
EDL Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Request for Declaratory Relief.
This lawsuit raises important and unique issues concerning the right of the people to
legislate directly. Article VI, section 1 of the Utah Constitution provides for the people of the
State of Utah to exercise their direct legislative power through initiatives and referenda. "Article
VI, section 1 is not merely a grant of the right to directly legislate, but reserves and guarantees
the initiative power to the people." Gallivan v. Walker. 2002 UT 89, U 23,

P.3d

(citations omitted). "The power of the legislature and the power of the people to legislate
through initiative and referenda are coequal, coextensive, and concurrent and share 'equal
dignity.'" IdL at H 23 (citations omitted). "Because the people's right to directly legislate through
initiative and referenda is sacrosanct and a fundamental right, Utah courts must defend it against
encroachment and maintain it inviolate." Id at U 27 (citations omitted).
While the Court is well aware of the importance of direct legislation in our constitutional
framework, it is equally cognizant of the fundamental principle of majority rule. "Our system of
government is premised on the notion of majority rule with minority rights. Majority rule is the
foundational premise of both of the constitutionally mandated mechanisms of enacting
legislation." Id at ^ 60. This principle of majority rule is inextricably linked to the mechanisms
by which people may initiate direct legislation. Under Utah law, the people's right to legislate
directly is set forth in two distinct mechanisms. First, if the people wish to exercise their
legislative power to enact a law or ordinance, they are required to follow the requirements
applicable to initiatives. See Utah Const. Art. VI, § 1 (2) (b) (i); Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-501 et
seq. ("Local Initiatives - Procedures"). Second, if the people wish to exercise their legislative
power to suspend or repeal a law or an ordinance, they are required to follow the requirements
applicable to referenda. See Utah Const. Art. VI, § 2 (b) (ii); Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-601 et
seq. ("Local Referenda - Procedures"). Hence, while the people's right to initiate direct
legislation is sacrosanct, the procedures for exercising that right are precise because the right of
direct legislation was not meant to frustrate majority rule but rather to carry it out.
By its own terms, the Initiative Petition at issue in this lawsuit seeks nothing more than a
re-vote on a binding fluoridation opinion question that was already approved by a majority of
Davis County voters in November, 2000, pursuant to the mechanism set forth in Section 19-4-

111 of the Utah Code. Since the voters of Davis County have already legislated the fluoridation
of water in Davis County in the November 2000 general election, and because the Petition
requests nothing more than to repeal that decision, the appropriate mechanism for the petition
sponsors to challenge the legislative action of the majority of Davis County voters was through
the referendum process.
The plain language of the Initiative Petition is entitled "Re-vote on Mandatory
Fluoridation Act" requests a "Repeal of prior action" and asks voters the identical question that
was asked in November of 2000: "Shouldfluoride be added to the public water supplies within
Davis County? " Thus, the Courtfindsthat the Initiative Petition seeks to do precisely what the
power of referendum is reserved for — the rejection of legislation that has already been adopted.
To allow the Initiative Petition to be placed on the ballot would effectively render the referenda
provisions in the Utah Constitution and the Utah Code meaningless and allow the petition
sponsors to subvert the important time requirements established by the State Legislature for
referenda. Accordingly, because the Initiative Petition must in substance be classified as a local
referendum, the Court finds that the Petition is untimely under Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-601(3).1
The Court's decision is also guided by the time-line set forth by plaintiffs counsel at the
hearing held on September 13, 2002. On May 1, 2000, Senate Bill 158 became effective,
amending Utah Code Ann. § 19-4-111 by authorizing second-class counties to vote on
fluoridation via the Commission's resolution. At that point, fluoridation of the water systems in
Davis County was not permitted unless the people voted in favor of it. On July 26, 2000, the
Davis County Commission adopted a resolution placing the fluoridation opinion question on the
1

The defendants also concede that if the Court construes the Initiative Petition as a
referendum, the petition sponsors have not complied with the law governing referenda. See
Defendants1 Memorandum In Opposition, p.5.

Davis County November, 2000 general election ballot. Thereafter, on November 7,2000, voters
in Davis County approved thefluoridationof Davis County water systems by a margin of 52% to
48%, thereby rendering the fluoridation of water systems in Davis County legal pursuant to the
mechanism established under state law in Utah Code § 19-4-111. At the moment the Board of
Canvass certified the election results on November 13, 2000, the 2000 vote approving
fluoridation became a legislative enactment pursuant to Utah Code § 19-4-111. Because the
Court considers the 2000 vote to be a legislative enactment, the enactment may only properly be
challenged by timelyfilingof a referendum petition. Both sides concede that a timely
referendum petition was notfiledin this case. The failure to timely file is fatal to a referendum
petition's legal viability. See Bigler v. Vernon, 855 P.2d 1390,1392 (Utah 1993) ("We have
emphasized previously the importance of strict compliance with the time limits contained in this
[referendum] provision (citations omitted)... This requirement serves the salutary purpose of
allowing the government and the public to rely on an ordinance as soon as the thirty-day period
expires.").
Even if viewed as an initiative, the Petition as submitted is an inappropriate mechanism
to change the law of fluoridation within Davis County. First, the plain language of Section 19-4111 of the Utah Code makes no provision for a re-vote once the question of fluoridation has been
answered in the affirmative by a majority of county voters. Nowhere in the state law is the
Commission (or county voters) given authority to reverse the voters' binding opinion vote
regarding waterfluoridationonce voter approval has been given.
Second, under the precise terms of the statute, there is a joint legislative role between the
Utah State Legislature and the voters of the county. Once the voters of the county are asked to
respond to a resolution that the Commission has placed on the ballot, the voters' affirmative

decision becomes incorporated into the state law. In the instant case, oncefluoridationhad been
approved by a majority of Davis County voters in the November 7, 2000 general election, that
decision was incorporated into the penumbra of Utah Code § 19-4-111, which in effect
established a "new" state law on November 13,2000 when the vote was certified by the Board of
Canvass. Because the voter approval process of Section 19-4-111 is a state law, it cannot be
changed by a local initiative. If citizens of a county desire to change a decision to fluoridate
their water systems, their only appropriate remedy to change the process is either to file a
statewide initiative pursuant to Section 20A-7-301 or to seek a statutory changefromthe Utah
State Legislature. As a result, the Courtfindsthat the Davis County Clerk's decision to allow
the Initiative Petition to be placed on the ballot violates Utah constitutional and statutory law
governing initiatives and referenda.
Based upon the foregoing, the Court also finds that plaintiff is entitled to a permanent
injunction enjoining the defendant Clerkfromplacing the Initiative Petition on the upcoming
general election ballot. Plaintiff has prevailed on the merits of its underlying claims against
defendant Clerk. Additionally, the Courtfindsthat the plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm
unless a permanent injunction was issued. Allowing the Initiative Petition to be placed on the
ballot would subvert the efforts of plaintiffs members and Davis County voters by allowing the
petition sponsors to misuse the people's direct legislative power to thwart the will of a majority
of Davis County voters. Plaintiffs members and supporters spent substantial time and sums of
money to comply with the legal and technical requirements governing the addition offluorideto
public water systems. To allow an unlawful Initiative Petition to proceed to the ballot box and
potentially undo a lawful vote on fluoridation in the 2000 election would cause a level of harm to
plaintiff, its members and Davis County voters that could not be adequately compensated in

monetary damages alone. Plaintiffs only real remedy in the case is injunctive relief.
The Court further finds that the harm suffered by plaintiff would significantly outweigh
any remote injury defendant may suffer from the injunction. The injunction merely asks the
Clerk to perform an official function of ceasingfromprinting and distributing election ballots
containing an unlawful Initiative Petition. In contrast, the very integrity of the people's direct
legislative power is at issue for plaintiff. If the Court allowed the Initiative Petition to be placed
on the ballot, the lawful vote of a majority of Davis County residents would be nullified by a
local initiative that this Court has deemed unlawfiil and untimely. Any reasonable balancing of
the damages, therefore, weighs in favor of issuing a permanent injunction.
The Court alsofindsthat issuing a permanent injunction in favor of plaintiff would not be
adverse to the public interest. While the Court recognizes and respects the people's right to
initiate direct legislation, the public, and Davis County voters in particular, have a real and
substantial interest in ensuring that the laws of initiative and referenda are scrupulously followed
and the election process adheres to the rule of law. Because of the important and unique issues
involved in this lawsuit, and for the reasons set forth in the memorandum decision, the Court
finds that the public interest is advanced by issuing an injunction.
ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, the Court hereby ORDERS, DECREES and ADJUDGES as
follows:
1.

The defendants' motion to consolidate the trial on the merits with the preliminary

injunction hearing is GRANTED.
2.

The defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of standing is DENIED.

3.

The defendants' motion to dismiss the County Commissioners as parties is

GRANTED.
4.

The affidavit of Lewis Garrett is ADMITTED into evidence based upon the

stipulation of the parties.
5.

The issue of plaintiffs attorneys5 fees is reserved by the Court for a later decision

subject to plaintiffs filing of a motion and supporting memorandum.
6.

The plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining the Davis County

Clerkfromplacing the Initiative Petition on the ballot is GRANTED and made permanent.
7.

A judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant Clerk on all causes of

action shall be entered.

DATED this \S_ day of October, 2002.
BY THE COURT:

0^U^

;i?v

Judge Glen R/p^son v ; -. >\
Second Judicial district Coiffr:!
•***•*•

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Gerald E. Hess
Attorney for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 4th day of October, 2002,1 delivered the foregoing Ruling to
the Clerk of the Second Judicial District Court, and that I faxed a true and correct copy of the
same to Gerald Hess, Esq. at (801) 451-4348.
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MELVIN C.WILSON -3513
Davis County Attorney
GERALD E. HESS -1475
Chief Civil Deputy
Davis County Attorney's Office
800 West State Street
P.O. Box 618
Farmington UT 84025
Tel: (801) 451-4300
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH

UTAHNS FOR BETTER DENTAL HEALTH
DAVIS, INC., a Utah Nonprofit Corporation,
Plaintiff

FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

vs.
DAVIS COUNTY COMMISSION,
Commissioner Dan R. McConkie,
Commissioner Carol R. Page,
Commissioner Michael J. Cragun;
DAVIS COUNTY CLERK,
Steve S. Rawlings,

Civil No. 020801343
Judge Glen R. Dawson

Defendants.

The above-entitled matter having come on for an evidentiary hearing on the 7th
day of August, 2003, before the above-entitled Court at 8:30 a.m. in Bountiful, Utah, the
Honorable Glen R. Dawson, District Judge, presiding,.and the Plaintiffs appearing by and
through their attorneys David R. Irvine and Janet Jenson, and the Defendant Steve Rawlings,
Findings of fact conclusions of law and <

Davis County Clerk/Auditor, also appearing in person and through his attorney Melvin C
Wilson, Davis County Attorney, and the Court having heard the testimony of the witnesses and
further having reviewed the pleadings and having heard and considered the arguments of the
attorneys for the parties herein, and the Court previously on October 15, 2002, having entered its
ruling relating to all issues in the proceedings with the exception of the issue of attorney's fees,
and the Plaintiff and Defendant having withdrawn their respective motions pursuant to Rule 11
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Court now being fully advised in the premises
enters the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The Defendant, Steve Rawlings, is the elected Davis County Clerk/Auditor
and is the chief election officer for Davis County and occupied that position during the time
periods relevant to the issues before the Court.
2. The defendant conducted the 2000 general election and pursuant to resolutions
enacted by the Davis County Commission did cause a countywide proposal concerning whether
fluoride should be added to the drinking water of the residents of Davis County to be placed on
the ballot.

In addition to the resolution he did cause a voter information pamphlet to be

published concerning the pros and cons of implementing fluoridation and did insert in the front
of the pamphlet information supplied to him by some cities and Weber Basin Water District on
estimated costs to fluoridate County water systems.
3. The Court has previously entered factual findings in the prior ruling entered on
October 15, 2002, and such are incorporated by reference into the findings herein.
4. Additionally the Court finds that the defendant Clerk/Auditor sought the legal
advice of Chief Civil Deputy County Attorney Gerald Hess at all stages of the initiative process

and followed the legal advice of counsel and that he performed his duties and responsibilities as
the Clerk/Auditor thought appropriate and in conformance with his good faith understanding of
what the law was at the time.
5. The Court finds that Defendants Clerk/Auditor and Commissioners followed
the advice of legal counsel and adhered to a legal position based upon their interpretation of the
Utah Constitution, the initiative statutes UCA 20A-7-501 et seq., and UCA 19-4-111 of the Safe
Drinking Water Act, and documents filed by the initiative sponsors.
6. The Court finds that there is no evidence of bad faith, bias or abdication of
duties on the part of the Clerk/Auditor or Commissioners in the events of 2002 and the
suggestions of bias from events in 2000-2001 are simply not persuasive that the Clerk/Auditor
abused or exceeded the scope of his authority as a public official.
7. The Court finds that there was no evidence that the actions of the County
Government was an attempt to subvert the rights of those who voted in 2000 and that even
though the voting rights are a significant issue in the context of this case, such significance does
not rise to the level envisioned by the Utah Supreme Court in Stewart v. Utah Public Service
Commission, 885 P2d 759 (Utah 1994).
8. The Court further finds that the evidence is insufficient to support an award of
attorney's fees as to the other judgment alternatives set forth in the Stewart decision, supra, in
that the litigation did not lesult in any common fund being created from which attorney's fees
can be paid, nor does the case, in the absence of evidence of bad faith, constitute an
extraordinary case, rather the Court finds that the case is unique and is a case of first impression,
but not of the extraordinary nature as envisioned in the Stewart decision.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court enters the following
Conclusions of Law.
1. There is no evidence of any bad faith or abdication of official duties and
responsibilities by the Davis County Clerk/Auditor, Davis County Commissioners or other
county government officials concerning the events of 2002 in respect to the initiative petition.
2. The Clerk/Auditor and County Commissioners were in good faith simply
involved in following the advice of legal counsel and taking a legal position based upon their
interpretation of the Utah Constitution, applicable statutes and documents filed by the sponsors
of the initiative petition in 2002.
3. The evidence adduced by Plaintiff is insufficient to support any award of
attorney's fees under any of the alternatives pursuant to the Private Attorney General Doctrine
established by the Utah Supreme Court in Stewart v. Public Service Commission, 885 P2d 759
(Utah 1994) and the Plaintiff should be denied any judgment for attorney's fees. However
Plaintiff, pursuant to 78-33-10 UCA, should be awarded judgment for costs incurred herein in
the amount of $267.15.
ORDER
The Court having previously entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
hereby enters the following Order.
1. The prior ruling of the Court entered October 15, 2002 is incorporated herein
and upon entry is made final.
2. The Plaintiff is hereby denied any award for attorney's fees.

3. The Plaintiff is awarded judgment against the Defendant for costs incurred in
the amount of $267,15.
Ordered this 4^

day of _

,2003.

By the Court

^^^J^iurf^

Approved as to form:

David R. Irvine
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 020801343 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Dated this

NAME
DAVID R IRVINE
ATTORNEY PLA
349 SOUTH 200 EAST
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111
MELVIN C. WILSON
ATTORNEY DEF
P.O. BOX 618
FARMINGTON UT 84025

Q/ day of

bepwrty Cour«€" £ler,k\1^
\
X
X \

~

s " i *•
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UBDH v. DAVIS COUNTY COM'N
Cite as 121 P.3d 39 (UtahApp 2005)

censure status was irrelevant to the Lees'
tort claims against him. We are unconvinced
that any error in the exclusion of this evidence resulted in a reasonable likelihood of a
different outcome for the Lees. Accordingly,
any error is harmless.
J14] 1124 The Lee's remaining arguments
address issues relating to Thorpe and Ranger's vicarious liability for the actions of Langley, All of:the Lees' tort claims, against
Langley were rejected either by the trial
court or by the jury, and we have affirmed
those decisions on, appeal. Vicarious liability
does not exist apart from the liability of some
putative primary tortfeasor, m this case
Langley. See Mann u Wad$worth> 776 P2d
92& 928-29 <ytah CtApp.1989) ("[g]ince
W^tfciss & Campbell's liability under respoflde^t superior is vicarious* it 4oe$ not exist
apart from Wadsvyorth's liability. The jury
held Wadsworth not liable, and the same
result must, therefore, also obtain for Watkiss & Campbell."). Accordingly, because
Qie Lees could not establish liability against
Langley, they could not establish vicarious
liability against Thorpe or Ranger as a matter of law. Any &ror in th£ trial court's
i-efusal to default Thorpe 4 dr admit the receipt signed by Thorpe into evidence therefore could not have been reasonably likely to
affect the outcome of the proceeding.
CONCLUSION
f 25 The trial court properly concluded
that Lee could not dispute Langleys authority to arrest him under the bail contract
despite Langley's lack of a Utah bail enforcement agent license. The trial court*also
properly dismissed both George and Gerald
Lee's claims for false imprisonment. The
Lees' other claims of error constitute, at
most, harmless error.
% 26 Accordingly, we affirm.
4.

"There is an important distinction between a
default and a default judgrrient[,]" and "the entry
of a default does not automatically entitle a
plaintiff to a default judgment for the damages
claimed m the complaint
Skanchy v Calcados
Ortope SA, 952 P 2d 1071, 1076 (Utah 1998)
' To entei a default judgment for unliquidated
damages a judge must review the complaint
determine whether the allegations state a valid

H27ICONCUK: NORMAN H.
JACKSON, Judge.
1281 CONCUR IN THE RESULT:
GREGORY K. ORME, Judge.
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UTAHNS FOR BETTER
DENTAL
HEALTH-DAVIS, INC., a Utah hon^of«
it corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
DAVIS COJJ^TY COMMISSION, Commissioner Dan RrJMcConkie, Commissioner
Carpi $. Page> Commissioner Michael J .
Cragup, Davis ^County Clerk, and Steve
& Rawlings? Defendants and Appellees.
No. 20030940-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Aug. 11, 2005.
Background: Group supporting water
fluoridation brought suit against county,
seeking declaration that petition seekinganother vote on fluoridation issue, and its
placement on ballot, was unlawful. The
Second District Court, Bountiful Department, Glen R. Dawson, J., granted group's
request for injunction, but denied group's
motion tot attorney fees. Group appealed.
Holding: The Court of Appeals, Thome,
J., held that action would be remanded for
additional findings required to support denial of attorney fees.
Remanded.
claim for relief, and award damages in an
amount that is supported by some valid evidence " Id In this case, even if Thorpe had been
defaulted, the Lees' complaint does not ' state a
valid claim for relief' against him in light of the
jury's verdLct in favor of his alleged agent, Lang
ley Id Accordingly no judgment would ever
have been entered against Thorpe even if he had
been defaulted

40 Utah

121 PACIFIC REPORTER, 3d SERIES

1. Appeal and Error <s=>984(5)
The appropriate standard for reviewing
equitable awards of attorney fees is abuse of
discretion.
2. Costs <©=*194.16
Utah generally follows the traditional
American rule that attorney fees cannot be
recovered by a prevailing party unless a
statute or contract authorizes such an award;
however, in the absence of a statutory or
contractual authorization, a court has inherent equitable power to awaiti reasonable atton^r fees when, it deems it appropriate^
the interests of justice and equity.
3. C&Hs &*194.42
Among the methods of granting an equitable award of attorney fees is the private
attorney general doctrine, under ttfhibn
courts have awarded attorney fees to a psldrty
as a "private attorney gerferaP' ^keu* the
vindication of a strong or societaHy imgbft&nt
public policy takes ]?lace &nd the iied£sfcary
costs in doing §o transcend the individual
plaintiffs pecuniary interest to an extent requiring subsidization.
4. Costs e=*208
Reviewing court insists that si trial
courts decision concerning a motion for, the
award of attorney fees be supported by adequate findings, for which they tnust show
that the court's judgfnent or decree follows
logically from, and is supported by, the evidence, and they shotild be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to
disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was -reached,
5. Appeal and Error <3=*1178(6)
Reviewing court would remand action to
trial court for additiohal findings TegaMing
water fluoridation group's request for attorney fees under private attorney general's
doctrine in obtaining an injunction to bar
placing initiative seeking vote to rescind earlier fluoridation approval for county water
system; trial court failed to make findings as
to whether group's lawsuit was vindicating a
strong or societally important public policy
and that its action transcended its own pecuniary interest to an extent that required

subsidization, and whether t h e
amounted to an extraordinary case.

action

Janet I. Jenson and David R. Irvine, Jenson & Stavros, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
Melvin C. Wilson, Farmington, a n d David
B. Thompson, Miller Vance & Thompson t C ,
Park City, for Appellees.
Before Judges BILLINGS, ORME, and
THORNE.
OPINION
THORNE, Judge:
HI Utahns for Better Dental HealthDavis, Inc. (UBDH) appeals the trial court's
denial of their request for attoHiey fees pursuant to the private attorney general doctrine. We remand for additional ftndiiigs.
BACKGROUND
1f2 UBDH Tjvas organized tp support efforts to fluoridate the water in Davis County
for the purpose of promoting better dental
health. In p^rt due to UBDH's efforts,
Davis County voters were presented with a
fluoridation initiative in 2000, which was approved by a majority of the voters. I n 2001,
Davis County began implementing the voters' decision and ordered all operators of
public water systems to add fluoride to their
water supply beginning no later than May
2002. In July 2002, the County Clerk, Steve
Rawlings, accepted a petition calling for another vote on the fluoridation issue. He
deterpiined that the .petition had a sufficient
number of verified signatures; consequently,
he certified the petition as an initiative petition and forwarded it to the County Commission. The Commission allowed the petition
to go on the ballot, without opposing commentary, and soon thereafter UBDH filed an
action seeking a declaratory judgment that
the petition—and its placement on the ballot—was unlawful and unconstitutional.
UBDH also sought an order enjoining Davis
County from placing the issue on the ballot
11 3 The trial court determined that the so
called initiative petition was actually a referendum, and that as such, it had not been filed
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timely. Moreover, the court determined that
the petition would not have been lawful as an
initiative petition. Consequently, the court
concluded that the decisions of the Clerk and
the Commission to place the issue on the
ballot were unlawfiil and unconstitutional-and
granted UBDH a permanent injunction barring the county from placing this particular
petition on the ballot

Among the methods of granting an equitable award of attorney fees [recognized in
Utah] is a doctrine known as the "private
attorney general." Under this doctrine,
"[clourts . . . have awarded attorney fees
to a party as a 'private attorney general*
when the Vindication of a strong or soeietaljy important public policy' takes place
and the necessary costs in doing so 'transcend the individual plaintiffs pecuniary
interest to an extent requiring subsidization.' "

114 UBDH then filed a motion for attorney
fe^, which the county opposed. In August
2Q03, the trial court h^ld a hearing on the
matter and then briefly took it u^er^adv^e- Shipmati v. Evans, 2004 UT 44, 128, 100
inent. The court issued an oral t decision P.3d 1151 (alterations in original) (citations
denying the motion for fees and requested omitted). iHowever, fees awarded under this
t^at the County Attorney draft the order. docthne are not ohly unusual, but they &tfe
UBDH was not satisfied witl^ the county^s awarded ohly in extraordinary cases. See id
proposed order and drafted its own alterna- at K 24*-< Thfc determination of whether a case
tive order, which it then submitted to the ris& to this level is preliminarily left to t h e
trial court. On October 3, 2003, .after review- discretion of the trial court, and "we will not
ing th{e competing draft orders, the trial undertake otir own assessment tit whether
court accepted the county's version with cer- [UBDH's actions] vindicated a public policy*
tain modifications. UBDH now appeals.
nor will we attempt to gauge anew the importance of any vindicated policy." Id at
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
f 25. Our review, then, is ultimately only4o
[1] 115 UBDH argues that the trial court determine if the trial court exceeded the
erred in denying its request for attorney fees permitted range of its discretion.
pursuant to the private attorney general doc[4] ^ 7 We do, however, insist that a trial
trine. "[T]he appropriate standard for recourt's decision concerning a motion for the
viewing equitable awards of attorney fees is
award of attorney fees be supported by adeabuse of discretion," Hughes v. Cafferty,
quate findings. See J. Pochynok Co. v.
2004 UT 22,1120,89 P.3d 148.
Smedsrud, 2005 UT 39, 1113, 116 £.3d 353.
Moreover,
ANALYSIS
{f]er findings of fact to be adequate, they
[2,3] 16 UBDH argues that its efforts to
"must show that the court's judgment or
force Davis County to act in conformance
decree
'follows logically from, and is supwith the law were required by the actions of
ported
by, the evidence.' The findings
the County Clerk and the County Commis'should
be
sufficiently detailed and iftcludd
sion; thus, the trial court erred in denying
enough
subsidiary
facts to disclose the
UBDH's motion for attorney fees "In gensteps
by
which
the
ultimate
conclusion on
eral, Utah follows the traditional American
each
factual
issue
was
reached.'"
rule that attorney fees cannot be recovered
by a prevailing party unless a statute or
contract authorizes such an award " Hughes
v Cafferty, 2004 UT 22, U 21, 89 P.3d 148
" 'However, in the absence of a statutory or
contractual authorization, a court has inherent equitable power to award reasonable attorney fees when it deems it appropriate m
the interests of justice and equity'" Id
(quoting Stewart v Public Serv Comm'n,
885 P 2d 759, 782 (Utah 1994))

Armed Forces Ins Exch v. Harrison, 2003
UT 14, 1128, 70 P.3d 35 (quoting Acton v
Dehran, 737 P 2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987)); see
also Butler, Crockett & Walsh Dev Corp v
Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co, 909 P.2d
225, 232 (Utah 1995) In the absence of
adequate findings, which eliminates our ability to "get a clear understanding of the basis
of the trial court's judgment," we must remand the issue for further findings 5 Am
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Jur.2d Appellate Review § 688 (1995); see
also Harrison, 2003 UT 14 at 1128, 70 P.3d
35.
[5] 1t 8 UBDH filed a motion in the trial
court requesting attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine. UDBH argued that by filing, 'and prevailing in, its
Action to enjoin Davis County from placing
the issue on the ballot, it was vindicating a
" 'strong or societally important public policy' " and that its action "*trancend[ed its
own] pecuniary interest to an extent requiring subsidization/ " (quoting Stewart v. public Sew. Comm'n, 885 P.2d 759* 783 (Utah
1994)). The trial court held an ^videjitjary
hearing on the iss^e, following whicji it issued its decision denying UBDH's daipi.

then to enter* conclusions consistent with
those findings. The court must articulate
sufficient subsidiary factual findings to illutninate and inform its eventual conclusion
regarding UBDH's petition for attorney fees
pursuant to the private attorney general doctrine.
CONCLUSION

112 Eligibility tot an award of attorney
fees undei* the private attorney general doctrine" is contingent upon the petitioner satisfying 'Several settled factors. However, the
trial court retains the discretion to deny the
request for fees. Whether the trial court
awards ot denies the requested fees, it must
support its decision with sufficient factual
A 9 Its decision, however, intermingles ele- findings to provide a basis for its decision.
ments of many of the various equitable doc- In this case, the trial court failed t o enter
trines by which a party might qualify lor adequate subsidiary findings to justify its
attorney fees. Moreover, the trial court did ultimate conclusion and in doing so eliminatnot specifically ad(}ress UBDIJ's private at- ed our ability to meaningfully review the
torney general doctrine claim. In particular, decision and ensure that the court has not
the trial court did not enter adequate find- abused its discretion.
ings concerning JJBDETs claipi that its efH13 Accordingly, we remand this case to
forts vindicated a societally important public
the
trial court,for the entry of adequate
policy. See Stewart, 885 P.2d #t 783. The
findings
and legal conclusions and a decision
trial court also failed to address whether
consistent
with those findings and concluUBDH's action transcended its Own pecunisions.
ary interests to an extent requiring subsidization. See id Finally, although the trial
1114 WE CONCUR: JUDITH M,
court did find that UBDH's action did not
amount to an extraordinary case, see id, it BILLINGS, Presiding Judge and
did so after concluding that the case'was GREGORY K ORME, Judge.
"unique," and that it involved "significant
[voting rights] issues." We find it impossible
(p | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM >
to reconcile these opposing views without
further factual support for, and an explanation of, the trial court's ultimate conclusion.
1110 Because these absent finding^ are essential to our review of the trial court's decision, we conclude that the trial court's factual
findings are inadequate Moreover, "[s]ince
it is not within our realm of authority to
make such findings," Harrison, 2003 UT 14
at H 32, 70 P.3d 35, we have no choice but to
remand this case to the trial court for the
entry of additional findings on these specific
issues
1111 On remand, the trial court is instruct
ed to enter appropriate findings given its
assessment of the evidence of record and
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Backgiound Defendant was convicted by
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Tab 4

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OFJCfr.

<.. '-i-6 . " * »I**3H
#$•

4fe,>S9v
UTAHNS FOR BETTER DENTAL
HEALTH - DAVIS, INC., a Utah Nonprofit
Corporation,

MEMORANDUM DECISION A N D %
ORDER
""x

Plaintiff,
Civil No. 020801343

vs.

DAVIS COUNTY CLERK,
Steve S. Rawlings,

Judge: GLEN R. DAWSON

Defendant.

BACKGROUND
This matter is before the Court on *'Plaintiff s Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and
Costs" filed November 7, 2002. Defendant's "Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Request
for Attorneys' Fees" was filed November 14,2002, and "Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in
Support of Its Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs" was filed November 25,2002. A
"Notice to Submit for Decision and Request for Oral Argument" was filed by Plaintiffs counsel
on December 11, 2002, and pursuant to a telephone scheduling conference on January 21, 2003,
the matter was originally set for oral argument on February 27, 2003.
After a series of subsequent filings and a number of conferences by the Court with
counsel, an evidentiary hearing was ultimately held on August 7, 2003, and oral findings and
conclusions were made by the Court on August 8, 2003. On October 2, 2003, the Court entered
an order denying Plaintiffs fees request. Subsequently, the Utah Court of Appeals remanded the

/

'0

x /

/

matter back to this Court for additional findings and the current decision is in response to the
Court of Appeals' request. This ruling is based on a review of the applicable case law as argued
by the parties, the evidence presented in the evidentiary hearing held on August 7, 2003, and the
factual findings contained in the Court's prior ruling entered October 15, 2002, which findings
are incorporated herein by reference. The Court intends that the findings and conclusions in this
decision will supplant the oral findings and conclusions made on August 8,2003, and the
findings, conclusions and order entered October 2,2003. The Court further intends that, to the
extent the current findings conflict with earlier oral or written pronouncements by this Court, this
decision should control as it relates to the issue of attorney fees.
ANALYSIS
The Utah Supreme Court recognized in Stewart v. Utah Public Service Commission, 885
P.2d 759, 782 (Utah 1994) (citations omitted), that:
The general rule in Utah, and the traditional American rule, subject to certain
exceptions, is that attorney fees cannot be recovered by a prevailing party unless a
statute or contract authorizes such an award.... However, in the absence of a
statutory or contractual authorization, a court has inherent equitable power to
award reasonable attorney fees when it deems it appropriate in the interest of
justice and equity. .
The Stewart Court recognized several categories of cases in which courts have exercised their
inherent equitable power to award reasonable attorney fees. This Court will address these
categories in analyzing whether it is appropriate to exercise this equitable power in the current
case.
First, the Stewart Court recognized that the equitable power has been exercised when a
party acts "in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons." Id. (quoting James W.
Moore et al, Moore's Federal Practice P 54.77 (2d ed. 1972)). In this Court's view, much of the
2

evidence provided by Plaintiff at the August 7,2003, evidentiary hearing was presented to show
that Defendant acted in bad faith and that Defendant was biased and prejudiced against those
who favored fluoridation in the county's drinking water. After reviewing the evidence presented,
the Court finds that Defendant did not act in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive
reasons, as will be explained below.
The Defendant, at all relevant times, was the elected Davis County Clerk/Auditor and
served as the chief election officer for Davis County. He conducted the 2000 general election
and pursuant to resolutions enacted by the Davis County Commission caused a countywide
proposal concerning whether fluoride should be added to the drinking water of the residents of
Davis County to be placed on the ballot. In addition to the resolution, he caused a voter
information pamphlet to be published concerning the pros and cons of implementing fluoridation
and inserted in the front of the pamphlet information supplied to him by some cities and the
Weber Basin Water District on estimated costs to fluoridate county water systems. In the general
election held on November 7, 2000, the voters of Davis County approved the addition of fluoride
to the public water supplies within the county by a vote of 44,403 in favor to 40,950 opposed. Of
the 85,353 voters who responded to that ballot question, 52% favored fluoridation and 48%
opposed fluoridation. As mandated by the requirements of Utah Code Annotated (UCA) Section
19-4-111(2), on April 5, 2001, the Davis County Health Department issued its order to operators
of public water systems directing that such operators add fluoride to those systems on or before
May 1,2002.
On May 8, 2001, a group of Davis County citizens filed an application, pursuant to UCA
§ 20A-7-502, with the Defendant to circulate an initiative petition ("Initiative Petition") which

3

tfey titled "Re-vote on Mandatory Fluoridation Act" requesting a "[rjepeal of prior action."
Sfecifically, the petition proposed that a re-vote on fluoridation be held, and that county voters
ajain be asked the question, "[s]hould fluoride be added to the public water supplies within
Dtvis County?" Thereafter, the sponsors began circulating the Initiative Petition to registered
voters within Davis County. In their Initiative Petition, the sponsors requested that it be
submitted to the Davis County Commission for its approval or rejection at its next meeting, or to
the legal voters of Davis County in the 2002 general election, if the County Commission rejected
the proposed law or took no action on it. After verifying the requisite number of signatures for a
local initiative petition pursuant to the local initiative petition statute, UCA § 20A-7-501(2),
Defendant submitted the Initiative Petition to the Commission on July 9, 2002, for the
Commission's further action as provided in UCA § 20A-7-501(3). At its next scheduled meeting
on August 6, 2002, the Commission took no action on the Initiative Petition, and the Defendant,
upon the advice of legal counsel, stated that he would put the petition question on the general
election ballot as required by UCA § 20A-7-501(3)(d). The instant lawsuit followed.
With regard to whether the Defendant acted in bad faith, this Court finds that the
Defendant sought the legal advice of Chief Civil Deputy County Attorney, Gerald Hess, at all
stages of the initiative process and performed his duties and responsibilities as the Clerk/Auditor
in conformance with his good faith understanding of what the law was at the time. Furthermore,
Defendant followed the advice of legal counsel and adhered to a legal position based upon
counsel's interpretation of the May 8, 2001, petition filed by the Davis County citizen's group in
conjunction with the Utah Constitution, the initiative statutes (UCA § 20A-7-501 et seq) and
UCA § 19-4-111. There is no evidence of bad faith, bias or abdication of duties on the part of
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tie Defendant in the events of 2002. The suggestions of bias from the events in 2000-2001
nised by Plaintiff at the August 2003, evidentiary hearing do not persuade the Court that the
Defendant abused or exceeded the scope of his authority as a public official Further, there was
ID evidence that the actions of the Defendant constituted an attempt to subvert the rights of those
vho voted in 2000, as suggested by Plaintiff.
In the Court's view, this case did not involve bad faith or an abdication of duties by
government officials. It simply involved government officials following the advice of legal
counsel, taking a good faith legal position based on their interpretation of the document filed by
tie initiative sponsors and applicable statutes. This case was a case of first impression for both
tie County Clerk and his attorney, as well as the Court as it relates to the appropriate
interpretation of UCA § 19-4-111 and citizen filings made pursuant to that statute.1
Second, the Utah Supreme Court in Stewart recognized that "an award of attorney fees is
common in class action cases when nonparty class members are financially benefitted as a result
of the efforts of a few litigants who successfully create a fund that benefits the entire class." 885
P,2d at 782. (citations omitted). This exception, often referred to as the "common fund" theory,
is typically applied when the activities of a party have resulted in the creation or preservation of a
fund of money out of which the fees are to be paid. In the present case, of course, there was no
monetary award and no "fund" was created or maintained by Plaintiff. Therefore, the Court
cannot use its equitable power to award attorney fees under the "common fund" theory.
In reference to this second category, the Stewart Court explained in a footnote that

Since the Court's ruling in October 2002, UCA § 19-4-111 has been clarified by the Legislature to allow a
new vote on the issue after four years. See Utah Code Ann. § 19-4-111(5) (2005).
5

"[a]ncjier expression of the inherent equitable power of a court to award attorney fees is
recognized when a plaintiffs litigation confers 'a substantial benefit on the members of an
ascertainable class.'" Id. at n.18 (quoting Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973) (citations omitted)).
In explaining this "substantial benefit" exception in footnote 18, the Stewart court quoted from
the California Supreme Court's decision in Serrano v. Priest 569 P.2d 1303,1309 (Cal. 1977).
The Serrano court opined that the "substantial benefit" exception may be viewed as an offshoot
of the "common fund" doctrine and "permits the award of fees when the litigant, proceeding in a
representative capacity, obtains a decision resulting in the conferral of a 'substantial benefit' of a
pecuniary or nonpecuniary nature." Id. The idea is that the court, in the exercise of its equitable
discretion, "may decree that under dictates of justice those receiving the benefit should contribute
to the costs of its production." IdL A brief review of this theory as analyzed in the Serrano case
and its potential application in this case will follow.
In Serrano, plaintiffs' attorneys (Public Advocates, Inc. and Western Center on Law and
Poverty) submitted motions for the award of fees against defendants, officials of the State of
California, under the "common fund," "substantial benefit," and "private attorney general"
theories after the California Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Los Angeles County
Superior Court. The Superior Court had ruled that the then-existing California public school
financing system was in violation of the state's constitutional provisions guaranteeing equal
protection of the laws. Serrano, 569 P.2d at 1304.
The plaintiffs in Serrano asserted that as a result of their litigation they conferred benefits
upon the state defendants, millions of taxpayers, children who were enrolled in and attending
public school, and the state itself. Id. at n. 11. The California Supreme Court agreed that findings
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existed showing that the litigation produced benefits of a conceptual or doctrinal character and
tven proposed that the plaintiffs had "rendered an enormous service to the state and all of its
citizens" by insuring that the state educational financing system was brought into compliance
vith the state constitution thereby enhancing equal educational opportunities for the children. Id.
Jt 1312. Even the bestowal of these enormous benefits, however, did not create a sufficient basis
br the equitable award of fees under the "substantial benefit" theory. The Court concluded that
to "award fees under the 'substantial benefit' theory on the basis of considerations of this nature
separate and apart from any consideration of actual and concrete benefits bestowed - would be
to extend that theory beyond its rational underpinnings." Id.
Applying the "substantial benefit" exception to the current case, the Court concludes that
there has been no evidence presented by Plaintiff of a substantial pecuniary benefit bestowed by
this litigation, and the Court further believes that any nonpecuniary benefit created by the
Plaintiff in this litigation is insufficient to warrant an award of fees. Plaintiff maintains that it
protected and vindicated the rights of the voters of Davis County by pursuing this action. In this
Court's view, this service to the citizens is, at best, akin to the service provided by the plaintiffs
in Serrano, absent of actual and concrete benefits, and therefore undeserving of equitable
consideration. While Plaintiff asserts that its efforts vindicated the rights of the voters, their
efforts can just as easily be viewed as supporting and protecting Plaintiffs personal views
regarding the benefit of fluoridation. This entity was organized specifically to advocate the
benefits of fluoridation in Davis County and to promote the public acceptance of water
fluoridation. They most certainly furthered their cause by obtaining a ruling that effectively
frustrated opponents of fluoridation from obtaining a re-vote on this issue in 2002. Further, an

7

argument can easily be made that only 52% of the voters in Davis County benefitted from the
Court's interpretation in this action leaving the other 48% disenfranchised in their view.
Doctrines of fairness and equity do not suggest that all citizens of Davis County, citizens almost
evenly divided on the merits of a polarizing issue, should have to pay the attorney fees for the
pro-fluoride advocates.
The third category recognized in Stewart provides that courts have also used their
equitable power to grant an award of attorney fees when a beneficiary sues a trustee for violation
of the trust and obtains recovery for all beneficiaries. 885 P.2d at 783. The case before this
Court is not of this nature and therefore, the Court cannot use its equitable power to award
attorney fees from this category.
The last category recognized by the court in Stewart is the "private attorney general"
doctrine. Id. The court's award of attorney fees in this category is considered when the
"Vindication of a strong or societally important public policy' takes place and the necessary costs
in doing so "transcend the individual plaintiffs pecuniary interest to an extent requiring
subsidization.'" Id. (quoting Serrano, 569 P.2d at 1314). In granting attorney fees under this
doctrine the Utah Supreme Court in Stewart noted the limited applicability of this category. It
said, "[W]e note the exceptional nature of this case. We further note that any future award of
attorney fees under this doctrine will take an equally extraordinary case." Id. at n.19.
In Stewart, petitioner and other telephone users and ratepayers brought suit against the
Utah Public Service Commission and U.S. West Communications, challenging an order from the
Commission that among other actions, increased respondent utility's authorized rate of return on
equity to 12.2%. The issue before the court was whether the Commission could "increase the
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luthorized rate of return on equity above a reasonable rate of return to induce a utility to make
'discretionary' investments in its plant and equipment in Utah." Id. at 769-70. Specifically, the
ratepayers challenged (1) the lawfulness of the 12.2% rate of return on equity and (2) the
(Dnstitutionality of Utah Code Annotated § 54-1-4.1 (1990), which authorized the Commission
b approve the incentive rate regulation plans and allowed a utility to veto such plans.
In ruling that a 12.2% rate of return on equity was not supported by the evidence, the
Utah Supreme Court found, among other things, that the Public Service Commission had a
history of "extraordinary abdication" of its statutory duties for a number of years. Id. at 774.
Such abdication resulted in U.S. West Communications (USWC) earning "approximately 45%
more than USWC's authorized rate of return" which amounted "to many tens of millions of
dollars collected from ratepayers in excess of a fair return." Id.
The Court also found that Utah Code Annotated § 54-1-4.1(2) was unconstitutional
because the statute illegally allowed for a delegation of legislative power to a private party. Id. at
776. The Utah Supreme Court held:
The Constitution does not confer a power on private parties to veto legislative acts.
Nevertheless, § 54-4-4.1(2) purports not only to confer a veto power on a utility
over a quasi-legislative act of the Commission, but it does so without establishing
any standards governing its exercise... .[T]his Court has held that the Legislature
cannot constitutionally delegate to private parties governmental power that can be
used to further private interests contrary to the public interest.
Id. at 775-76.
In awarding fees the Supreme Court noted the exceptional nature of the case and focused
on the substantial monetary benefits conferred on all ratepayers by plaintiffs' actions and the
windfall obtained by respondent USWC. They found:
The results achieved by the ratepayers will necessarily benefit all USWC
9

ratepayers in the state of Utah especially as to future rates, irrespective of whether
a refund of past overcharges might ultimately be ordered. Here, USWC has
collected rates under a rate of return that is unlawful and was authorized by the
Commission's unlawful "incentive regulation" order to retain revenues in excess
of a reasonable rate of return. But for plaintiffs1 action, all that would have been
unchallenged, and none of USWC's ratepayers would ever have had any relief. In
the absence of a common fund, and under these circumstances, it is appropriate to
require the shareholders of USWC to pay the cost of plaintiffs' reasonable attorney
fees. See Serrano, 569 P.2d at 1314.
id. at 783-84.
Turning to the current case, the first question is whether the plaintiff by this action has
lindicated a strong or societally important public policy.2 In analyzing this question, the Court
notes that the principal finding in this litigation was simply that the May 8, 2001, document was
most appropriately interpreted as a local referendum and not as an initiative petition and was
therefore untimely. While the Court recognizes that the people's right to directly legislate
through initiative and referendum is an important and fundamental right, this Court is not
iaclined to conclude that the mere interpretation of a contested petition involves "vindication of a
strong or societally important public policy." Also, the fact that plaintiff accomplished personal
interests by pursuing this matter disinclines the Court from finding that this factor has been met.
Further, even if this criterion for fees had been met, there is no evidence that the
necessary costs of the litigation "transcend the individual plaintiffs pecuniary interest to an
extent requiring subsidization." Id. at 783. There was no showing by Plaintiff during the
evidentiary hearing of the necessity for private enforcement nor of the magnitude of the resultant
burden on the plaintiff. There was no evidence of Plaintiff s ability to pay attorney fees without
assistance. There was no showing whatsoever of Plaintiff s financial resources or interests.

At the outset, an expression of fallibility is appropriate I am somewhat uncomfortable attempting to
quantify the relative importance of the public policy involved in this litigation. I concede it may be best for the state
legislature to determine which public policies are of sufficient importance to warrant an award of attorney fees. See
Serrano, 569 P.2d at 1314-1315.

There was no showing that the burden placed on Plaintiff in pursuing this litigation, even if
necessary, was out of proportion to Plaintiffs individual stake in the matter. The burden to make
such a factual showing was clearly on the Plaintiff. Without a sufficient factual showing
regarding these matters, attorney fees cannot be allowed.
Finally, in this Court's view, the current case is simply not of the exceptional nature or
magnitude described in Stewart. While the case was unique to this Court because it was the first
time this Court had been asked to interpret whether a particular document should be
appropriately categorized as an initiative petition, it is not, in this Court's view, the extraordinary
type of case envisioned by Stewart. First of all, there were no monetary benefits created by
plaintiffs actions as in Stewart nor was there a windfall to Defendant. While these factors alone
may not be controlling, this Court perceives that the significant monetary benefits related to
future rates bestowed by the plaintiffs actions in Stewart were an important reason for the
Court's decision regarding attorney fees under the "private attorney general" doctrine. Again,
there are no such benefits in this case. This Court cannot even find actual or concrete benefits
created in this case. Also, the magnitude and history of the abdication of duties by the Public
Service Commission found in Stewart are lacking in this case. As the Court has previously
found, the Davis County Clerk performed his duties in good faith following the advice of legal
counsel. This is far different from the Stewart findings of a history of extraordinary abdication by
the Commission of its statutory duties for a number of years.3
All of these factors lead the Court to conclude that the "private attorney general" doctrine
does not apply in this case.
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While the Court recognized that Defendant's interpretation led to an inappropriate result as applied to the unique
Initiative Petition in this case, this is far different from a finding that a state statute is unconstitutional

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the Court concludesfirst,the Plaintiff did not present
efficient evidence that the Defendant acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for
oppressive reasons. Second, Plaintiff presented no evidence regarding the "common fund"
tieory. In the alternative, Plaintiff did not present sufficient evidence that as a result of the
Itigation there was a conferral of a "substantial benefit" of either a pecuniary or nonpecuniary
nature that would warrant an equitable award of fees. Third, this case does not involve a
leneficiaiy who sued a trustee for violation of the trust. Finally, Plaintiff rendered insufficient
evidence to support an award of attorney fees under the "private attorney general" doctrine.
The Court cannot conceive of any other approach that would allow this Court to use its
quitable power to grant Plaintiffs attorneys5 fees in this case. Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Plaintiffs request for attorneys' fees is denied.

Dated February

H , 2006.

BY THE COURT:

\

^.<3GEEN,& DAWSON
C\d)ist$a&x:ouRT JUDGE
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision and
Order dated thisr^V

day of ^ - : ^ j 2 ^ ^ t £ ^ / 7 2 0 0 6 , postage prepaid, to the following:

ITtah Court of Appeals
Office of the Clerk
450 South State Street P.O. Box 140230
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230
David R. Irvine
Janet I. Jenson
Jenson & Stavros
350 South 400 East, Suite 201
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Melvin C. Wilson
Davis County Attorney
800 West State Street
P.O. Box 618
Farmington, UT 84025
David B. Thompson
Miller, Vance & Thompson
P.O. Box 682800
2200 N. Park Ave. Bldg. D #200
Park City, Utah 84068
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Commissioner Page made a motion to authorize signing of the agreement and with a second from Commissioner Stevenson, this motion carried.

Voucher For
Use of
Landfill
Available

Commissioner McConkie referred to a letter from Wasatch Energy indicating that effective October
1,2000 vouchers would be available in the cities for residents to use die energy recovery district and land fill
areas for $5.00. These vouchers will also be available through June of 2001.

Commissioner McConkie read the following Resolution regarding thefluorideissue:

Resolution
#2000-191
Re: Vote On
Fluoride
Adopted

#2000-191
RESOLUTION
A RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING THE
PLACEMENT ON THE BALLOT THE OPINION
QUESTION RELATING TO FLUORIDATION OF
ALL PUBLIC WATER SYSTEMS WITHIN DAVIS COUNTY
WHEREAS, the Davis County has received a request from the Davis County Health Department that
it adopt a resolution placing on the ballot at the next general election the opinion question relating to
fluoridation of all public water systems within Davis County; and
WHEREAS, Richard Harvey, Interim Health Director and Head of the Environmental Health and
Laboratory Division of the Davis County Health Department, has issued his report concluding that all public
water systems in Davis County are not functionally separate systems; and
WHEREAS, representatives from the Davis County Board of Health indicate that most of the water
systems in Davis County are so interconnected that one system could not fluoridate its water without having
an effect o the other systems surrounding it; and
W! IEREAS, Senator Edgar Allen, the sponsor of Senate Bill 158, has explained that his intent in
adoptinf : legislation was to require a county-wide vote on the issue offluoridationin counties where water
systems $L re water with each other and are not independent from each other; and
V* 8REAS, Keidi M. Woodwell, Associate General Counsel of the Office of Legislative Research
and Gene. Counsel, has opined that he legislature intended in Senate Bill 158 to require a county-wide vote
on fluoride * m unless separate public water systems existed with independent water supplies and not
receiving \ terfromany other water supply from anodier public water system; and
W 3REAS, based upon information received from the Davis County Health Department, there are
no function ly separate water systems in Davis County, therefore, any vote onfluoridationshould be a
county-wia. vote without the requirement of counting the votes separately in any municipal water system or
district watw system.
THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the Board of County Commissioners of Davis County as
follows:
1.
Pursuant to Section 19-4-111, Utah Code Ann., as amended by Senate Bill 158 adopted
during the 2000 general session of the Utah State Legislature, the Davis County Commission directs that an
opinion question relating to thefluoridationof all public water systems within Davis County be placed on the
ballot at the next general election which will be held on Tuesday, November 7,2000.
2.

The specific question to be placed before the voters is as follows:

COMMISSIONERS' MINUTES - DAVIS COUNTY

0462

Shouldfluorinebe added to the public water supplies within Davis County?
UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTED this 26th day of July, 2000, with Commissioners Dannie R.
McConkie, Carol R. Page, and Gayle A. Stevenson all voting "aye."
DAVIS COUNTY
Bv /s/ Dannie R. McConkie
Dannie R. McConkie, Chairman
Board of County Commissioners
ATTEST:
/$/Steve S, Rawlings
Steve S. Rawlings
Davis County Clerk/Auditor
The Commission feels the November election is a fair public forum to decide whedier fluoride should be
placed in the water. A motion was made by commissioner Stevenson to adopt the resolution as presented and
read. This motion unanimously carried as each voted "aye" to the secondfromCommissioner Page.

ualizations
proved

Upon recommendation of Carol Buckley, Davis County Assessor, tax equalizations were approved
for Paul and Rhonda Hill (14-166-0017) and Carlos and Irene Salazar (12-265-0048) with a motion from
Commissioner Page. After a second to the motion was given by Commissioner Stevenson, this motion
carried.

< Refunds
Droved

Upon recommendation of Carol Buckley, Davis County Assessor, tax refunds were approved for the
following with a motionfromCommissioner Stevenson:
Bountiful
Kaysville
BalaCnydwdy,PA
Woodbridge, NJ
Brigham City, Utah
Fruit Heights
Portland, Oregon
Bedford, Texas
Louisville, Kentucky

Lakeview Animal Clinic
Jones-Edward D. Jones & Company
American Business Leasing Inc.
Bellsouth Wireless Data LP
Big West Oil Company
Brad Stone Golf Inc.
HLC Financial Inc. (2)
Qualex Inc. #1755
Pizza Hut #201017

Second to the motion was made by Commissioner Page and after a unanimous "aye" vote, this motion
carried.

Meeting adjojimed.
dl—f\an.
Clerk

COMMISSION MINUTES
31 July 2000
The Board of Davis County Commissioners met in the Commission Chambers of the Davis County
Courthouse, Farmington, Utah, on July 31,2000. Members present were Commissioner Carol R. Page,
Commissioner Gayle A. Stevenson, Clerk/Auditor Steve S. Rawlings, Deputy County Attorney Gerald E.
1 Hess and Deputy Clerk Nancy Bumingham. Commissioner Dannie R. McConkie was excused
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COMMISSION MINUTES
28 August 2000

l

CASEN0.^a^l3(/j
DATEREC'D
I IN EVIDENCE
CLERK

\3tS

The Board of Davis County Commissioners met in the Commission Chambers of the Davis County
Courthouse, Farmington, Utah, on August 28,2000. Members present were Chairman Dannie R. McConkie,
Commissioner Carol R. Page, Commissioner Gayle A. Stevenson, Clerk/Auditor Steve S. Rawlings, Deputy
County Attorney Gerald E. Hess and Deputy Clerk Nancy Burningham.

m's Acres
bdivision
>proved

Barry Burton, Davis County Community and Economic Development
requested approval of the Ann's Acres Subdivisionfinalplat. The subdivision is located in the Hooper area
at 5500 West and 2425 North. One large parcel is being divided into two lots. A portion of the property will
be dedicated to the road which is already in existence. Pipe will be installed along the road frontage of 228
feet where an open ditch exists and where a driveway will be constructed. A variance will be granted as the
open ditch on the 191 foot side of the lot will not be piped at this time. The standard lien agreement related
to installation of curb, gutter and sidewalks will be required. The Davis County Planning Commission has
approved thefinalplat request and recommends approval of such. Commissioner Stevenson made a motion
for final approval of the Ann's Acres Subdivisionfinalplat widi the conditions outlined. Commissioner Page
seconded this motion, each voted "aye", motion carried.

isolution
2000-213
> Place 1/4
ant Sales
ix For
*ans. Issue
n Nov.
action Balt Adopted

A Resolution #2000-213 to place on the November election ballot a proposal to impose a onequarter cent sales and use tax was presented for consideration and adoption and reads as follows:

#2000-213

RESOLUTION
A RESOLUTION TO PLACE ON THE BALLOT A
PROPOSAL TO IMPOSE A ONE-QUARTR CENT
SALES AND USE TAX ON ALL SALES AND USES
WITHIN DAVIS COUNTY AS AUTHORIZED BY LAW.
WHEREAS, Section 59-12-502 of the Utah Code allows Davis County to impose a sales and use
tax of lA of 1% on all sales and uses widiin Davis County as authorized by law to fund a "fixed guideway and
expanded public transportation system"; and
WHEREAS, Davis County may impose the tax referreed to in this Resolution only if the Davis
County Commission submits by resolution the proposal to all qualified voters widiin die County for approval
at a general or special election conducted i nthe manner provided by law; and
WHEREAS, die Davis County Commission is in need of additional revenue to fund a fixed guideway
and expanded public transportation system within Davis County.
BE IT RESOLVED by die Board of County Commissioners of Davis County that the following
proposal be submitted to all qualified voters within Davis County for approval at die general election to be
held on November 7,2000:
Be it resolved diat die Davis County Commission shall impose a sales and use tax of onefourth cent per dollar effective January 1,2001, on all sales and uses widiin Davis County as
audiorized by law for die purpose of implementing a long range regional transportation
improvement plan and system, which includes funding a fixed guideway (computer or light
rail system) and expanded public transportation system (increasedfrequencyand coverage
of bus service including evenings, holidays and Sundays).

Be it further resolved that if the majority of voters voting in the general election approve the
foregoing proposal it shall become effective on the first day of January 2001.

UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTED this 28th day of August, 2000, with Commissioners Dannie R.
McConkie, Carol R. Page and Gayle A. Stevenson all voting "aye."
DAVIS COUNTY
By Isf Dannie R. McConkie
Dannie R McConkie, Chairman
Board of County Commissioners
ATTEST:
M .Steve S. Rawlines
Steve S. Rawlings
Davis County Clerk/Auditor
Kathryn Pett of the Utah Transit Authority suggested a change in the original wording of the resolution to
clarify that the funds would be used for a long range regional transportation improvement plan with funds
collected in Davis County to be used in Davis County. Mike Allegra of the Utah Transit Authority indicated
that UTA reports annually revenues and where the funds are spent. Davis County Attorney Gerald Hess
stated that the language of die resolution to be adopted needed to be close to State Statute requirements in the
event the issue is challenged. After some discussion regarding the clarity of die resolution language for the
public to understand that the funds would be used in Davis County to enhance public transit to connect with
Weber and Salt Lake Counties, die foregoing resolution was adopted. A motion was made by Commissioner
Page to place the sales tax resolution on die November ballot as modified. This motion carried after a
unanimous "aye" vote to the secondfromCommissioner Stevenson. Stewart Adams of the Transportation
Task Force and Fruit Heights Mayor Richard Harvey spoke in favor of the resolution.

Fawn Jensen, Davis County Clerk/Auditor Department
presented the following property tax equalization requests for approval by the Board of Equalization as
recommended by the County Assessor:
01-225-0157
02-164-0081
03-039-0038
05-047-0071
05-053-0079
09-090-0023
09-159-0143
11-047-0704
11-123-0004
12-238-1214
01-197-0016
03-035-0026
03-178-0005
04-087-0106
04-123-0018
05-086-0031
07-042-0025
07-075-0418
08-104-0138
09-020-0008,09-020-0009
09-265-0005
11-416-0207

Paul & Judith Turner
Jack Ricks
Richard & Kris Brierley
Bret & Amy Johnson
Toni May Hoffman
Grant & Barbara Major
Scott McNair
Dean & Gwen Pierce
Donald Nay
John &Mei Lin young
Robert Vickerman
Osterloh Investment Co.
Joseph & Georgine Steenblik
Tommy & Marsha Baker
John & Shawna May
Konrad & Erika Klotz
Charles Edwards
Kimberlee Home
Michael Greenhalgh
Dale Lorbeske
Burrell Davis
Cory Holm
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DAVIS COUNTY WATER FLUORIDATION
INFORMATION PAMPHLET

Election publication by
Davis County Clerk/Auditor Election Office
Authorized by Davis County Commission
In compliance with Utah State
Election Law
20A-7-402

Davis County BaJJoi Measure # 2
Fluoridation of Davis County Culinary Water Supply

Should fluoride be added to the public water supplies within Davis
County?

Clarification: The ballot question addresses the addition of one milligram
fluoride per liter of water.
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PRELIMINARY INFORMATION

Cost of proposed measure # 2:
Some cities have indicated they anticipate recovering costs by connection
through increasing base rates. Following are the estimated increases for those
cities reporting:

City
Centerville
North Salt Lake
Woods Cross
Bountiful

Connection Fee
Annual Increase

Base Rate
%Increase

$31
$31
$18
$12

22%
17%
19%
20%

The Davis Health Board reports that fluoridation of the public culinary water
systems in Davis County will produce an average cost per person per year of
approximately $2. The Health Department has also reported that Fruit Heights
will have an estimated connection charge of $3.80 equating to a per person per
year cost of under $1.
Costs referred to above have been included in this pamphlet as submitted and
have not been audited or otherwise verified by the Davis County
CIerk/Auditor\s Department.
If you wish further information on specific costs in your area contact your city
or water district office.
Arguments against and for measure # 2:
The arguments against and for Davis County Ballot Measure # 2 are the
opinions of the authors and have been printed as submitted. They have been
placed in this information pamphlet in the order determined by a random
selection assisted by members of the Health Board and the Health Department.
Public Review
A complete copy of the fluoride resolution and measure is available at the
Davis County Courthouse, Farmington, Utah.
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ARGUMENT AGAINST FLUORIDATION
There are different kinds of fluoride. The kind of fluoride used in 90% of the
fluoridation systems
•is NOT the naturally-occurring calcium fluoride already present in water.
•is NOT pharmaceutical grade fluoride that's in over-the-counter products or
prescription tablets/drops.
•is NOT biodegradable.
•IS a cumulative poison.
•IS more toxic than lead.
•CANNOT legally be dumped into the ocean.
Many scientists oppose fluoridation. "As the professionals who are
charged with assessing the safety of drinking water, we conclude that the
health and welfare of the public is not sewed by the addition of this substance
to the public water supply/ (EPA union scientists/professionals) Twelve Nobel
Prize winners in chemistry and biology oppose fluoridation. Most
endorsements for fluoridation by trade associations are based on outdated
information, not current research/data.
Health risks. "Subsets of the population may be unusually susceptible to the
toxic effects of fluoride...[including] the elderly, people with [nutritional]
deficiencies...and people with cardiovascular and kidney problems.11 (U.S.
Health and Human Services) Children from low-income families are at
particular risk because of nutritional deficiencies.
Congressional investigation. The FDA, CDC, and EPA have NO studies
showing safety or effectiveness of the kinds of fluoride actually usedto
fluoridate water. (Congressional subcommittee, June, 2000) The investigation
is continuing.
Fluoride ON the teeth, not IN the body, fights tooth decay best.
"Fluoride...works primarily via topical mechanisms." (Cover story, Journal
of the American Dental Association, July, 2000) "...regular exposure to
fluoride (toothpastes/rinses) [is] superior to fluoridated water for [cavity]
prevention." (Pediatric Nursing; 23(2):155-159,1997)
Recommended Dally Fluoride Supplementation (American Dental
Association):
•Pregnant women, none
•Infants to six months, none
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Overdosing Is Inevitable. It is impossible to control the amount of water
people drink; therefore, it is impossible to control how much fluoride adults,
children, and infants consume. Also, many beverages, baby foods, cereals,
and juices, processed with fluoridated water, contain unsafe levels of fluoride
far above the amount suggested for our water. Dental fluorosis
(mottling/discoloration of teeth) ife one result of too much fluoride.
FDA does not classify fluoride as an essential nutrient. There is no such
thing as a fluoride deficiency disease.
Fluoridation may Increase property taxes. Water districts can cover their
costs for fluoridation through water bills and/or increased property taxes. A full
disclosure of ALL costs has NOT been made.
Fluoride's already available for children who need It. Free fluoride rinses
are available in public schools. Utah's Children's Health Insurance Plan
(CHIP) covers dental care for children in low/middleHncome households.
Mass-medication. It's not appropriate to use the public water supply as a
delivery system for medication. There's a difference between treating water
with chlorine to make it safe and treating people with a drug or medication.
FDA classifies fluoride as an unapproved drug.
Medication without consent. It's morally wrong to force people to take a
medication without their consent or against their will. Should we force
fluoridation on our neighbors, especially when new research shows that we
don't have to drink fluoride to get the best effect from it?

Vote NO on FLUORIDATION!
www.StopFluoridation.homestead.com

Gene W. Miller, Ph.D., Professor Emeritus; former head—Department of
Biology, Utah State Univ.
Marc D. Flack, D.D.S., F.A.G.D., F.IAO.M.T.
Paul Barney, MD
David A. Hansen, Citizens for Safe Drinking Water—Utah, Davis County
Howard C. Nielson, Utah State Senator, Former U.S. Congressman
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ARGUMENT FOR FLUORIDATION
Recently, Surgeon General David Satcher stated: "Community water
fluoridation remains one of the great achievements of public health in the
twentieth century!" Why? Because it is a safe and inexpensive means of
improving dental health for everyone. Thousands of U.S. communities are
fluoridating their water today, with the first one beginning in 1945. Despite
fluoridation's impressive record, Davis County has not taken advantage of this
remarkable public health measure. Our votes this year can make a difference
in oral health for us and for succeeding generations. Please consider the
following:
What About Fluoride? Fluoride is a naturally occurring trace element found in
all water. It is important for the development of healthy bones and teeth. The
Institute of Medicine (1997) classified fluoride as a micronutrient, citing it, along
with calcium, phosphorus, magnesium, and vitamin D, as an "important
constituent in maintaining health,"
What Is Water Fluoridation? Water fluoridation is the adjustment of the
natural fluoride content of water to one part per million (1ppm)--a level of
intake that strengthens tooth enamel and sharply reduces dental decay.
Does Fluoridation Work? Yes! Fluoridation can prevent as much as 40-60%
of decay in children and adults. It works better than other forms of fluoride
because it is less expensive, more reliable, and does not require a conscious
action to use it.
Is Fluoridation Safe? Absolutely! Although a few, very vocal critics oppose
fluoridation, the science and medical communities are solidly behind it. There
have been literally thousands of scientific studies done to examine the
effectiveness and safety of fluoride. Each new study has reaffirmed its medical
safety and its effectiveness in preventing dental disease. This is why credible
scientific, dental, medical and public health organizations everywhere support
water fluoridation. It is why Hill Air Force Base implemented fluoridation
several years ago. And, it is why over 270 Davis County doctors and dentists
have endorsed water fluoridation and are recommending it to their patients.
Is Fluoridation Expensive? Water fluoridation is a bargain. Average national
yearly costs vary from 31 c - $2.12 per person (U.S. Public Health Service).
Carefully estimated, average, county-wide costs in Davis County are expected
to be about $2 per person per year. Fluoridation is much less expensive than
treating tooth decay. For every $1 spent on fluoridation, up to $80 is saved in
dental treatment costs.
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Does Water Fluoridation Violate Personal Rights? Fluoridation is viewed by
the courts as a proper means of furthering public health and welfare. The
federal appellate courts have ruled 13 times that water fluoridation does hot
violate personal or religious constitutional rights under the First, Fifth, or
Fourteenth Amendments. The Utah Legislature views fluoridation as a proper
issue for the majority of voters to determine. Voters in Brigham City and Helper
chose fluoridation in the 1960s.
Fluoridation has a 50 year track record of safety and effectiveness. More than
70% of the U.S. population enjoys its benefits. It's time for us to do the same.
Please vote YES on water fluoridation.

Beth Q. Beck, EdD, Chairperson, Davis County Board of Health
Edward B. Clark, MD, Medical Director, Primary Children's Medical Center
Brian D. Rigby, DMD, South Davis Dental Society President, Utah
Dental Association
J. Leon Sorenson, Executive Vice President, Utah Medical Association
Tammy Anderson, Region III Director, Utah Parent Teacher Association
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Steve S. Rawlings
)avis County Clerk/Auditor
P.O. Box 618
^armington, UT 84025
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AVERAGE COST PER PERSON IN 2002 OF DAVIS COUNTY
1/4 CENT TRANSIT SALES TAX APPROVED IN 2000 ELECTION
1. The 1/4 cent additional transit sales tax passed in 2000 produced revenue in the
amount of $6,665,986.50 for the first full year of collection in 2002.
2. Divided by a Davis County population of 250,000 for 2001, the cost per person of that
additional 1/4 cent is $26.66.
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May 7.2001
David A Hansen
380 Oak Lane
Kaysvaie, UT 84037
(801)544-2744
Sieve Rawhngs
Davis County Clerk/Auditor
P.O. Box 618
Farraington, UT 84025-0618

MAY 0 8 2001
DAVIS COUNTY CLERK/AUDITOR

^UlNIIFPSExST

IKHIBITHO.

_/C

I W EVIDENCE.
[CLERK

Dear Mr. Rawlings*
Please accept the attached initiative petition as the first phase of the petition process. We, the
undersigned, want a re-vote on the issue of waterfluoridationfor Davis County placed on the
November 2002 ballot.
The Initiative Description is as follows;
"Re-vote on Mandatory Fluoridation Act"
Also, we respectfully demand that we be allowed to select the wording of the question as it will
appear on the ballot I will contact you and Davis County Civil Attorney Gerald Hess once the
petition is filed to work out the details of the wording of the ballot question.
Filially we respectfully demand that your office begin to process the paper work so that we may
begin to collect the required signatures as soon as possible. If you have any further questions,
please feel free to contact me at (801)544-2744 (evenings) or (801)594-3857 (daytime).
Thank you for your attention to this matter.
Sincerely,
David A. Hansen
enc: Initiative Description and Sponsor Signatures

Wet*
We, the undersigned, propose the following question be placed on the 2002 General Election
ballot in Davis County:
Initiative Description:

The opportunity to re-vote ou the addition of fluoride to the
Davis County public water supplies

WE, THE UKDERSIGNED, WANT THE ISSUE OF WATER FLUORIDATION FOR DAVIS
COUNTY PLACED ON THE NOVEMBER 2002 BALLOT.
Sponsor Statement

I, David A. Hansen, affirm I am a registered voter and I have voted in a regular general election in Utah within
the last three years.
x—\
,
David A- Hansen
380 Oak Lane
Kaysville, UT 84037
(801)544-2744

\

Subscribed and affirmed before me this
A.D. 2001

y / ^ / V
Sponsor's Signature

O

-a

_ day of
NOTARY PUBLIC

Nancy L Stevanton
Notary Public

28 6ast$taloSL
Farmlngton, Utan 9402S
My Commission 6*pira*

'

January 3. Z0<U
STATE OF UTAH

Sponsor Statement
t Curtis Oda, affirm I am a registered voter and I have voted in a regular general election in Utah within the last
three years.
Curtis 0<Ja
$70 S. State
Clearfield, UT 84015
(801)773-9796

Sponsor's Signature

Subscribed and affirmed before me this
• AJD. 2001

f^L

day of

jQjd^.
NOTARY PUBLIC ~~

Nancy L Stev«nton

t

^?1« '7 Iff J^

Notary Publii

yLa*/th*-^'
,^JZJ&£

21 East Statu St.
FarmtaQton.Utafi u o z s
My Cammisaitn Exjrfft*

January 3,2004
STATE OF UTAH

75"

Sponsor Statement
I, James R. Knowies, affirm I am a regisiered^votenind I have vpi^d inajcfip lar general election in Utah wiihin
%
the last rhree ye&xs
s'T*?
<
." _ J ^ ' / / ' / '-—A
James FL Knowies
458 S. 230 W.
KaysviHc. UT 84Q37
(801)547*5084

^jjz^^
/
/^^ponsorTSignature
\y

Subscribed and affirmed before me this t

<Tt>

>yof72ZiUi

NOTARY PUBLIC

]

Nancy L Stevenson

A.D. 2001

2fl East State SI.
Farmington.Utah 84025
My Commission Expires
January 3.2004
STATE OF fJTAH

Noiarv Public

Sponsor Statement
I, Helen J. Watts, affirm I am a registered voter and I have voted in a regular general election in Utah within the
last three yeara.
Helen J. Wato
2589 E. 2750 N.
Laytoa UT 84040
(801)771-2621

Spon$o£6 Signature

Subscribed and affirmed before me this g

^
S ,

day of fugy

A.D. 2001

NOTARY PUBLIC

-*S£§>S

^SSur^V

ton "AW
Notaiy Public

fs( SSreHct Yet
'51 mt&m
12}
v
toy

-

UNDA

MAY

2 e Ea f
*r
Fm

Sta*« $*"*
™*9 °n. Utah 84025
Uommisjioft Expires
Gcwoer 5, ?,002

STATE OF OTAfl

J>

Sponsor Statement
I, David W. Monson, iffirm I am a registered voter and I have voted in a regular general election in Utah within
the last three yeais.
David W. Monson
137 S. 400 E,
Clearfield, UT 84015
(801)773-2435
Subscribed and affirmed before me this
AJD. 2001

/Sponsor's Signature/

7 j ~ _ _ - day

of/zhzfa
"NOTARY PUBLIC

SNL Nancy L. Steransan
A

™

25ea5tStawSt.

INITIATIVE PETITION
To the Honorable Sieve kawlings, Davis County Clerk/Auditor:
Wc, the undersigned citizens of Davis County, Utah, respectfully request that the following proposed law, aRe-vote on Man
Fluoridation AcV\ be submitted to the Davis County Commission for its approval or rejection at its next meeting, or to the I
voters of Davis County in the 2002 general election if the County Commission rejects the proposed law or takes no action 01
Re-vote on Mandatory Fluoridation Act
Sectiou 1. Finding of the Voters: We the voters of Davis County find that:
a.
b.
c.
d.

Evidence points io health risks to persons who ingest or use fluoride, its derivatives> or compounds;
Full disclosure of these risks have not been made lo the citizens of Davis County;
It is unconstitutional for one segment of Ihe population to impair another segment's freedom of choice by fluoridating
public water supply.
1 rue county-wide costs have not been disclosed, and recent cost estimates are astronomical.

Section 2. Rcquesi for re-vote on fluoridation. We the voters of Davis County respectfully demand that the question be re-submitle
voters with the ballot reading as follows: "Should fluoride be added to the public water supplies within Davis County?"
Section ; 3. Repeal of prior action: We the volers of Davis County request that if the voters return a NO answer to the ballot, the pub
water supplies in Davis County shall not be fluoridated and that all fluoridation and/or proposed fluoridation of public water suppli<
cease.
Section 4. Infective date: This act shall lake e fleet five days following its passage by a vote of the legal voters of Davis County.
Section 5. Severability Clause: If any provision of this act, or the application of any provision to any person or circumstances, is h
invalid, the lcmainder of this chapter shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application.
Each signer of this petition states:
i have personally signed this petition; I am registered lo vote in Utah or intend to become registered to vote in Utah before the ceriii
of the petition names by the county clerk.

Initiative Title: Re-vote on Mandatory Fluoridation Act

(TCT)/>6*

Wui'iiitftg: It is ci class A. nu&rtcurcaiior for anyone lo sign m) milinlive petition uttli any oilier iimac thaw liis own, or knowingly io sign Uis name more than OIKC for llw same mcciswc, or lo s
initiative petition when he kuov-s t«c is uol a tegistered volcr oiid kno\vs _Jutf he does nol i.Uend lo become registered lo vote before the certification of the petition names by the county deck.

Each signer says: "I have personally signed this petition; I am registered io vote in Utah or intend to become registered to vote in 11 ta
the certification of the petition names by the county clerk; and my residence and i>ost office address are written correctly after my na
l

J

Foromrcu^ouiy j
R C

*

i

••

"

•

Registered Voter's Printed Name

1

Signature of Registered Voter

tXfus-be1c*kUioW«:©~.rd)

I

t
i
II

j

1

,.,

_
.

—_____

._____ _____ .... .

!

I

|

J
1

[
j

I

:

i

:

J

Street Address, City, State, Zip Co

"VERIFICATION

State of Utah, County of Davis
I.
hereby state that: I am registered to vote in Utah,

of

"All the names that appear on this sheet were signed by persons who professed to be the persons whose names appear in it, and each of them
his name on it in my presence;
I believe that each has printed and signed his name and written his post office address and residence correctly, and that each signer is registe
vole in Utah or imends to become registered to vote before the certification of the petition names by the county clerk,1*

Signature of Witness
Address of Witness
Phone Number

Tab 10

Davis County Clerk/Auditor
Steve S, Rawlings, CGFM

Patricia Beckstead

Clerk/Auditor

Elections Coordinator
801-451-3589

CERTIFICATION
INITIATIVE PETITION
Rlv VOTE < )N MANDATORY FLUORIDATION ACT

I, Steve S. Rawlings, Clerk/Auditor of Davis County, State of Utah, do hereby
certify that 8,663 signatures are required to submit the attached Initiative Petition for
"Re-Vote on Mandatory Fluoridation Act" to the Davis County Commission. A11
signature packets have been completed and 9,650 have been verified as registered voters.

SUMMARY
Packets received
Signatures Filed
Registered
Not Registered
Duplicate Signatures
Illegible
Disqualified

207
12,146
9,650
1,478
847
36
135

r\

Dated this 9^_ day of July 2002.

d^ve4

Rawlings
Davis County Clerk/Audito;

(SEAL)

PLAINTIFFS EXHIBIT 1
EXHIBIT NO. / « ? DATEREC'D
IN EVIDENCE

CLERK

/

S

May 7,2001
David A. Hansen
380 Oak Lane
Kaysville,UT 84037
(801)544-2744

pgOTfU
MAY 0 8 2001
DAVIS COUNTY CLERK/AUDITOR

Steve Rawlings
Davis County Clerk/Auditor
P.O. Box 618
Farmington, UT 84025-0618
Dear Mr. Rawlings:
Please accept the attached initiative petition as thefirstphase of the petition process. We, the
undersigned, want a re-vote on the issue of waterfluoridationfor Davis County placed on the
November 2002 ballot
The Initiative Description is as follows:
"Re-vote on Mandatory Fluoridation Act"
Also, we respectfully demand that we be allowed to select the wording of the question as it will
appear on the ballot. I will contact you and Davis County Civil Attorney Gerald Hess once the
petition is filed to work out the details of the wording of the ballot question.
Finally we respectfully demand that your office begin to process the paper work so that we may
begin to collect the required signatures as soon as possible. If you have any further questions,
please feelfreeto contact me at (801)544-2744 (evenings) or (801)594-3857 (daytime).
Thank you for your attention to this matter.
Sjncexely,
David A. Hansen
enc: Initiative Description and Sponsor Signatures

We, i
.idersigned, propost Hit following qi
ballot in Davis County:
Initiative Description:

n be placed on the 2002 General Etev

The opportunity to re-vote on the addition of fluoride to the
Davis County public water supplies

WE, THE UNDERSIGNED, WANT THE ISSUE OF WATER FIIJORIDATION FOR DAVIS
COUNTY PLACED ON THE NOVEMBER 2002 BALLOT.
Sponsor Statement
I, David A. Hansen, affii in 1 am a registered voter and I have voted in a regular general election in Utah within
the last three years,
^—\
David A. Hansen
380 Oak Lane
Kaysville,UT 84037
(801)544-2744

Sponsor's Signature

Subscribed and affirmed before me this
AJD. 2001

Q_

day

«8LV-

NOTARY PUBLIC

Nancy L. Stevenson
28 East State St.
Farmlngton.Utah 84025
My Commission Expires
January 3.2004
STATE OF UTAH

n'^Tj^MS-U^
N01

Publ&

Sponsor Statement
I, Curtis Oda, affirm I am a registered voter and I have voted in a regular general election in Utah within the last
three years.
s
Curtis Oda
970 S. State
Clearfield, UT 84015
(801)773-9796
Subscribed and affirmed before me this
AD. 2001

Sponsor's Signature

7 ^

day of/9/feU/-.
V.

NOTARY PUBLIC

Nancy L. Stevenson
Nol•tary Publi^

21 East State St.
Farmington.Utah §4025
My Ctmmissitn Exerts

January 3,2004
STATE OF UTAH

Sponso

.^cement

I, James R. Knowles, affirm I am a registered voterjmd I have ^
the last three years.

;ular general election in Utah within

James R. Knowles
458 S. 230 W.
Kaysville, UT 84037
(801)547-5084
Subscribed and affirmed before me this.
A.D. 2001

$L

day oft/JlA^L

NOTARY PUBLIC

Nancy L. Stevenson
28 East State St.
Farmington.Utah 84025
My Commission Expires

'<*<JJJ£KA

•

January 3,2004
STATE OF UTAH

sQ$U*A4<vi<L+-v(_J

Putfic

Sponsor Statement
I, Helen J. Watts, affirm I am a registered voter and I have voted in a regular general election in Utah within the
last three years.

/Liu, Q- Wirffr

Helen J. Watts
2589 E. 2750 N.
Layton UT 84040
(801)771-2621

Sponsc£& Signature

Subscribed and affirmed before me this
A.D. 2001

-\\

day of IUQV

NOTARY PUBLIC
LINDA MAY
28 East State Street
Farminpton, Utah 84025
toy Commission Expires
Ociooer 5,2002

ton -AW

Notary Public

^

STATE OF UTAH

Sponsor Statement
I, David W. Monson, affirm I am a registered voter and I have voted in a regular general election in Utah within
the last three years.
David W. Monson
137 S. 400 E.
Clearfield, UT 84015
(801)773-2435
Subscribed and affirmed before me this
AD 2001

Notary PubHc

ytZ

day of
NOTARY PUBLIC
Nancy L. Stevenson
28 East State St.
Farmington.Utah 84025
My Commission Expires
January 3,2004

^.<</3^^^<^X^
<s2S*

RTATr? OF UTAH

INITIATIVE PETITION
To the Honorable Steve Rawlings, Davis County Clerk/Auditor:
Vf
he undersigned citizens of Davis County, Utah, respectfully request that the following proposed law, "Re-vote on Mandatory
?L jridation Acf\ be submitted to the Davis County Commission for its approval or rejection at its next meeting, or to the legal
voters of Davis County in the 2002 general election if the County Commission rejects the proposed law or takes no action on it.
Re-vote on Mandatory Fluoridation A ct
Jectioe 1. Finding of the Voters: We the voters of Davis County find that:
a.
b
c
d.

Evidence points to health risks to persons who ingest or use fluoride, its derivatives, or compounds;
Full disclosure of these risks have not been made to the citizens of Davis County;
It is unconstitutional for one segment of the population to impair another segment's freedom of choice by fluoridating the
public water supply,
True county-wide costs have not been disclosed, and recent cost estimates are astronomical

j 2. Request for re-vote on fluoridation: We the voters of Davis County respectfully demand that the question be re-submitted to the
oters with the ballot reading as follows: "Should fluoride be added to the public water supplies within Davis County?"
ection 3. Repeal of prior action: We the voters of Davis County request that if the voters return a NO answer to the ballot, the public
rater supplies in D&vis County shall not be fluoridated and that all fluoridation and/or proposed fluoridation of public water supplies shall
sase.
action 4, Effective date: This act shall take effect five days following its passage by a vote of the legal voters of Davis County.
action 5. Severability Clause: If any provision of this act, or the application of any provision to any person or circumstances, is held
valid, the remainder of this chapter shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application.
r

** signer of this petition states:

lave personally signed this petition; I am registered to vote in Utah or intend to become registered to vote in Utah before the certification
the petition names by the county clerk.

UAVI5 Ul M m I Y —IIMIIIAI |vt- M H H
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-N REPORTING FORM

c-VOTE ON MANDATORY FLUORIDATION AC I

Page 1 OT 5

Packet #

Sig. Filed

Registered

Non-Reg

Diff. Add.

Illegible

Duplicates

Diff. Co

Disqualified

100

68

56

9

3

0

0

0

0

101

69

54

12

3

0

0

0

0

107

68

60

1

2

0

5

0

0

108

55

45

1

1

0

8

0

0

110

5

5

0

0

0

0

0

0

111

18

34

4

2

0

8

0

0

112

2B

28

0

0

0

0

0

0

1 16

10

63

2

1

0

4

0

0

I20

70

49

14

5

i

1

0

0

123

49

40

1

2

0

6

0

0

127

69

45

20

2

0

2

0

0

I29

71

62

5

2

0

2

0

0

133

51

51

2

1

0

3

0

0

134

59

47

7

2

0

3

0

0

141

69

59

5

5

0

0

0

0

143

16

12

2

1

0

0

0

1

145

50

35

9

1

0

3

0

2

146

65

48

4

4

0

1

0

8

147

59

46

4

4

0

5

0

0

148

21

15

3

5

0

1

0

3

149

3i

27

4

1

0

1

0

1

153

33

24

0

2

0

7

0

0

154

70

57

6

4

0

0

0

3

155

70

59

7

2

0

1

0

1

161

52

43

6

0

0

3

0

0

165

45

21

16

1

0

5

0

2

168

80

54

3

3

0

0'

0

0

•

171

61

26

18

4

0

5

0

8

173

66

35

20

6

1

0

0

4

174

69

53

7

2

0

7

0

I l

175

70

52

6

2

0

9

0

1'

184

34

23

4

2

0

,1

0

2

185

1I

61

4

2

0

1

0

3

.186

68

59

2

2

0

3

0

190

61

43

2

2

0

9

0

C

191

68

61

2

4

0

1

0

0

192

71

59

4

3

0

5

0

0

193

64

55

5

0

0

1

0

0

55

7

1

0

5

0

0

55

6

0

0

9

0

0

61

45

3

4

0

8

0

1

209

47

33

8

4

0

1

0

1

211

104

5

5

0

0

0

0

0

0

213

57

45

7

1

0

4

0

0

219

53

3 i

DAVIS COUNTY-INITIATiy-^PETITION REPORTING FORM
[ II I riON TITLE:

Packet #

Kt-VOTE ON MANDATORY FLUORIDATION AC I

Page 2 of 5
Duplicates

Diff Co

Disqualified

0

1

0

1

10

7

?

0

CI

2

1

0

0

0

0

0

Sig. Filed

Registered

Non-Reg

Diff.Add,

226

67

59

6

228

b9

50

232

49

46

Illegible

222

234

66

46

7

9

4

253

lii.fi.

52

5

7

1

0

0

254

..11!

37

2

0

9

0

0

264

Ml

42

0

5

3

0

0

282

41

31

7

2

4

0

0

291

Hii.11

44

11

2

11

0

0
0

292

,10

23

1

7

4

0

294

28

23

1

0

4

0

0

295

42

27

3

3

I)

0

3

298

50

35

1

7

!

0

0

299

70

58

3

1

8

0

0

304

60

39

6

1

4

0

10

305

50

15

3

2

23

0

"1

315

70

65

2

2

0

0

0

320

54

44

2

3

5

0

0

45

3

4

6

0

0
1

323

1

324

("•!«!

54

9

4

0

0

326

'II

59

5

2

3

0

0

60

5

4

0

0

0

69

64

5

0

0

0

0

329

70

63

4

3

0

0

0

330

70

56

8

2

4

0

0

331

70

43

4

2

17

0

4

334

713

62

2

3

3

0

0

335

68

50

16

2

0

0

0

339

68

41

18

5

3

0

1

340

66

37

!.»1

4

4

0

0

341

88

54

7

5

1

0

1

362

39

19

2

5

1,0

0

3

367

47

36

4

5

2

0

0

368

68

47

8

4

6

0

3

1

0

1

0

0

327
328

380
381

68

45

14

3

5

0

0

383

69

44

18

4

3

0

0

390

70

64

1

4

1

0

0

392

68

60

4

0

0'

0

393

44

38

2

2

1

0

1

404

59

54

2

1

2

0

0

416

70

47

8

7

8

0

0

418

64

57

2

2

3

0

0

42ft

4

DAVIS COUNTY -INITIATE PETITION REPORTING FORM
PETITION TITLE:

KE-VOTE ON MANDATORY FLUORIDATION ACi

Page 3 of 5

Packet #

Sig. Filed

Registered

Non-Reg

Dill Add

Illegible

Duplicates

430

70

52

7

3

0

8

433

47

30

11

3

0

b

436

64

42

b

4

4

1

437

33

15

4

2

0

B

3

0

i

0

1

439

70

53

t

440

60

hi

4

446

52

34

"1

3

0

9

m

i

2

1

0

11

6

0

i

447
454

U

0

1

0

ti.

456

(j!f!

SO

LI

5

0

i

462

70

58

6

4

0

n

487

33

27

3

2

0

1

4

0

?

3

0

1

4

0

j

455

W

490

72

9»

i

491

08

On'

i

496

ill

499

70

\ i

3

1

t

500

70

66

2

0

0

501

70

48

11

6

0

5

501A

44

34

0

0

0

4

1/

j

2

0

1

502

04

m

503

Ml.

44

i

2

1

1

504

tt'1

Ml

10

4

0

*i

0

0

0

506

68

fj2

i

509

40

36

4

0

0

0

513

48

29

2

1

0

7

517

71

OH

U

3

0

1

519

?!i

ill

1

2

0

0

519A

I'l

fi

2

0

10

520

53

411

3

0

0

1

520A

70

57

8

2

0

3

521

70

64

2

0

0

4

522

70

4,"

1 i

4

0

B

522A

4;

10

1

2

0

0

524

111!

19

1

0

0

525

68

3a

24

0

4

1

526

69

55

10

2

0

(

531

89

57

4

1

0

7

»>33

71

()*"!

(.

0

0

0

038

44

30

4

1

0

;"

040

70

4J

1

0

i
n

541

67

b2

1I

3

1

0

542

70

03

4

0

0

*)

542A

70

45

11

6

3

»i

Diff. Co.

Disqualified
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Page 4 ol {'3

Registered

Non-Reg

Dlff. Add.

Illegible

Duplicates

Dlff. Co.

Disqualified

t>45

70

53

9

0

0

8

0

0

545A

44

29

5

3

0

I

0

0

547

8

4

1

1

0

1

0

1

548

64

33

21

1

0

9

0

0

55

9

4

0

1

0

0

5

549
550

II

61

2

2

0

0

0

551

1,'"t«

90

20

8

0

0

0

552

/III

56

6

3

0

0

0

2\l

4

0

0

2

0

111.

70

65

4

0

0

1

0

Il II

60

7

1

0

3

0

0

552A

553
554

71

554A

pi

62

15

6

0

5

0

0

555

(><l

56

9

1

0

3

0

0

557

,J"II

54

5

3

0

7

0

1

557A

in 1

46

2

1

0

2

0

0

558

25

16

5

0

0

1

0

0

560

70

37

24

3

1

5

0

0

562

69

40

17

7

0

5

0

0

563

Ml

49

9

0

0

2

0

0

564

! nil!

3?

13

5

0

6

0

1

,S1

7

1

0

10

0

0

I?

564A

41i

567

70

53

14

1

0

0

0

568

56

34

12

10

0

0

0

0

569

52

45

5

2

0

0

0

0

569A

70

54

0

3

0

3

0

1

570

70'

Gl

0

0

3

0

0

571

49

29

4

0

9

0

0

572

70

44

5

0

3

0'

0

573

50

31

0

0

17

0

0

7

574

69

52

14

0

0

3

0

0

574A

/(I

3?

34

4

0

0

0

0

575

liilll

50

0

7

0

1

0

1

577

H

I

i"

0

0

CI

0

0

580

47

211

0«

3

0

10

0

0

582

63

37
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COMMISSION MINUTES
July 9,2002
The Board of Davis County Commissioners met in the Commission Chambers of the Davis
County Courthouse, Farmington, Utah, on July 9,2002. Members present were Commissioner Dannie R.
McConkie, Commissioner Michael J. Cragun, Clerk/Auditor Steve S. Rawlings, Chief Deputy Civil
Attorney Gerald E. Hess, and Commission Office Manager Linda May. Commissioner Carol R. Page was
excused as she is attending a conference in Santa Fe, New Mexico.

Public Hearing

Commissioner Cragun made a motion to go into a public hearing. The motion was seconded by
Commissioner McConkie. All voted aye.

Rezone of
One Parcel
A-5toA-l
for Earl
Payne

Barry Burton, Community and Economic Development, introduced Earl Payne. The purpose of
the public hearing is to address a rezone of one parcel from A-5 to A-l as requested by Mr. Payne. The
address is 1146 So. 4500 W in Syracuse. The land is boarded currently on two sides by A-l parcels. The
sewer system* and utilities for services are in place. There were no public comments made.

Commissioner Cragun made a motion to close the public meeting. Commissioner McConkie
seconded the motion. All voted aye.

approval of
Rezone for
:arl Payne

\greement
^2002-145
lorgan Ashalt for
ub. Works
arkmg Lot

Commissioner Cragun made a motion to approve the rezone of one parcel from A-5 to A-l as
explained at the public hearing. Commissioner McConkie seconded the motion. All voted aye.

Dave Adamson, Davis County Public Works Director, presented an agreement #2002-145 with
Morgan Asphalt, Inc. It is to construct a parking lot adjacent to the new Public Works Office Building. It
is in the amount of $58,600.00. Commissioner Cragun made a motion to approve. Commissioner
McConkie seconded the motion. All voted aye. The document is on file in the office of the Davis County
Clerk/Auditor.

zreement
2002>I46
ache Valley j
ectnc for
•affic Con}l Loops

Dave Adamson also presented an agreement #2002-146 with Cache Valley Electric. It is to install
a video detection camera and traffic control loops to control the traffic light at 300 North 1000 West in
Clearfield, Utah. It is in the amount of $850.00 to install the video detection camera and $3,600.00 to
install the three traffic control loops. Commissioner Cragun made a motion to approve. Commissioner
McConkie seconded the motion. All voted aye. The document is on file in the office of the Davis County
Clerk/Auditor.

jrtification

Steve Rawlings, Clerk/Auditor, and Pat Beckstead, Election Coordinator, presented the
Certification for the Initiative Petition Re-vote on Mandatory Fluoridation Act. The signatures required
were 8,663. All signature packets have been completed and 9,650 signatures have been verified as
registered voters. The recommendation of the Commission is to forward the information to the Davis
County Attorney Office for review and preparation of legal opinion to be given to the Commission on or
before the meeting of August 6,2002.
HIBIT
EXHIBIT1NU.
NO. _!Y j 3JJm % • ••
ICASENOOA5^
DATEREC'D
IN EVIDENCE
CLERK

IS

. r ^
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Davis Court. > Clerk/Auditor
S. Rawlings. CGFM
Cleric/Auditor

TO:

Jerry Hess

hkOM:

Steve S. Rawlings ^ R _

DATE:
RE:

'

7

002

•io i'cuuon

Alter our discussion yesterday and reviewing the letter you received from Mr. David
Irvine and the press release initiated by Utahns for Better Dental Health written by Beth
::
k and David Irvine, I would respectfnllv re.nv ^>t that you consider the following in
•. .uJknng '/our op'':-' *-;
Section 20A-1-40: of the Election Code related to controversies says "(1) Courts, and
lion officers shall construe the provisions of Title 20At Election Code, liberally to
nnt the intent of th is title."
Case law already in place mandates that the clerk (election official) cannot refuse a
petition 'that is filed .and must take such petition to the legislative body if the required
signatures are obtained .and certified.
:||3US petition

filed does have 'the heading "Initiative Petition" and does ask for a re vote on
an, existing law. Liberally interpreting the election code, the petition could be
.constructively construed as having the intent of a "Referendum Petition" which requires
'the same number of signatures as an initiative petition. If the intent is to revote on an
r'Sosting law the petition has fulfilled, in content and body, the requirements of a
Referendum Petition."
tlsing Mr. Irvine's own words from his press release, "1 hey are required to seek a
referendum before the act complained of takes effect." The act of adding fluoride to the
public culinary water systems in Davis County requires that one part per million be added
to the system. That law has not yet been enacted because the mandate to fluoridate has
not yet been fulfilled and has, in fact, been extended by the Board of Health until October
15, 2002. It could be legitimately argued that the date the act takes effect is the date that
one part per million is actually added to the "entire" Davis County Water System as
required by the vote. In addition, with the court ruling related to Woods Cross, an
argument may be made that the law as enacted and voted upon will never be able to "take
effect" because an. entire city within the County wil 1 not add any fluoride to the water.

(

&

)

"

•

As you remember, voting precincts and water district boundaries in the County do not
match and it was decided that the election must be a "countywide" election and the vote
considered such. No one City could stand-alone. Fluoridation is not yet a part of the
entire County's water systems and may never be enacted in the entire County as the vote
originally required.
Mr. Irvine erroneously states in his letter to you 'The petition was filed with the County
Clerk just aTew weeks ago." The fact is that the petition was officially filed with my
office,* according to definitions and requirements of the election code, on May 8,2001
& d is"well in advance of any fluoride being added to the water and the law taking effect
if,*in fact, the law can ever take effect in the entire County. This date is also within the
35-day timeframe of the fluoride order being issued by the Health Department on April 5,
2001, which may be considered the date the law went into effect
Your initial opinion letter, which I requested prior to the 2000 election, on the feasibility
of having a countywide vote on fluoridation cautioned that the fluoride legislation itself
was flawed and that the legislature should be asked to define the term "functionally
separate" prior to the County embarking into putting the question on the ballot. You also
cautioned that there were some cities and or water districts that may be functionally
separate. Your concerns have now come to fruition and the law has not and cannot be
fully implemented as originally promised by the Health Board and voted upon.
It should also be mentioned that the press release talks about Centerville and the two
votes held there (second vote by petition) related to fluoride in a positive way but makes
no mention of the Court case involving Woods Cross City.
Thanks again, for your dedicated time and concern.
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Pat Beckstead stated that the special session of the legislature has determined that the election

lection
lanvass
)ate for
Jeneral
lection

canvass can occur 7 -14 days following an election. This will allow each county to determine the date
they will hold their canvass within the 7 -14 day time frame.

Commissioner Cragun made a motion to go into closed session to discuss pending litigation.

Hosed
ession

Commissioner Page seconded the motion. All voted aye.

No further action upon returning to open meeting. Meeting adjourned.

COMMISSION MINUTES
August 6,2002
The Board of Davis County Commissioners met in the Commission Chambers of the Davis
County Courthouse, Farmington, Utah, on August 6, 2002. Members present were Chairman Dannie R.
McConkie, Commissioner Carol R. Page, Commissioner Michael J. Cragun, Clerk/Auditor Steve S.
Rawlings, Chief Deputy Civil County Attorney Gerald E. Hess, and Commission Office Manager Linda
May.

onsiderion of Iniitive Peti)n Re-vote
^ Manda>ry Fluoriition Act

The petition for consideration of the Initiative Petition Re-vote on Mandatory Fluoridation Act is
before the commission. Commissioner McConkie stated that the merits offluoride,either for or against,
will not be debated today. The petition has been presented and the factual data regarding the petition has
been reviewed by the Davis County Attorney Office. Commissioner McConkie asked for Jerry Hess,
Davis County Civil Attorney, to present his findings. The issue of a referendum or initiative petition was

o Motion
iven

reviewed according to definition and under the laws of the State of Utah. A referendum by definition is to

itition Sent

challenge a law passed by a local legislative body and repeal the law. An initiative petition is a new law.

erk/Aud>r for Plac5 on the
Hot

It is governed by election law. The constitution provides for petition initiatives. The process followed has
met the requirements of the law. Jerry Hess stated that the Commissioners can (1) adopt and refer the
matter to the people, (2) adopt and not refer to the people, or (3) reject the matter. Commissioner
McConkie stated that he feels neutrality is in the best interest of the Commission, otherwise, to adopt
would be to set up challenge under Utah Code appearing to put an end to fluoridation or to reject would
give appearance of endorsement to continue thefluoridation.There are 9650 people who have signed the
petition for revote which required 8663. Commissioner McConkie called twice for a motion and none was
given. There was no action taken on this matter by the Commissioners. The Initiative Petition is now sent
to Steve Rawlings, Davis County Clerk/Auditor, for preparation of putting it on the ballot in November
according to election law. Mr. Rawlings stated that his office will ask the attorney's office for the official
wording and move forward to place it on the ballot.
(HIBIT

PLAINTIFFS
EXHIBIT NO.
DATERECD
IN EVIDENCE

CLERK

/

iU

,

/ T^

—.
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David R. Irvine (1621)
255 East 400 South, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
(801)328-1155
:

Janet I. Jenson (4226)
JENSON & STAVROS, LLC
255 East 400 South, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
(801)363-4011

- W > DISTRICT COURT

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

UTAHNS FOR BETTER DENTAL HEALTH
DAVIS, INC., a Utah Nonprofit Corporation,
Plaintiff,

Civil No.: 020801343

vs.

DAVIS COUNTY COMMISSION,
Commissioner Dan R. McConkie,
Commissioner Carol R. Page,
Commissioner Michael J. Cragun;
DAVIS COUNTY CLERK,
Steve S. Rawlings,

Judge Glen R. Dawson

Defendant.

PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES and COSTS

I. THE COURT HAS EQUITY POWER TO AWARD PLAINTIFF
ITS ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS.
1. Normally, attorneys' fees are not awarded to the prevailing party absent a contractual
agreement or a statutory basis for making such an award. However, the Utah Supreme Court has
recognized a doctrine in equity for making an award of attorneys' fees where a governmental entity
charged with the statutory responsibility of enforcing the law fails to do so and that burden fells to
private citizens. This is the "private attorney general" doctrine set out at length by the Court in
Stewart v. Utah Public Service Commission, 885 P.2d 759,781-784 (Utah 1994).
2. In the Stewart case, the Public Service Commission and all the state agencies charged
by law with the responsibility to set, review, or challenge utility rates, including the Committee of
Consumer Services and the Division of Public Utilities, entered into a stipulation with U.S. West in
which they all agreed to an incentive rate plan which allowed U.S. West to set its own rates and to
veto any rates the Commission might adopt with which U.S. West disagreed. The citizenratepayers who brought suit believed that all of the State's utility regulatory agencies had violated
the law and the Utah Constitution. The Utah Supreme Court agreed, finding that the stipulated
incentive rate plan was unconstitutional and permitted U.S. West to set rates that resulted in an
unlawfully high rate of return.
3. Moreover, the Stewart court awarded the citizen-plaintiffs their attorneys' fees.
Stewart directly applies to the facts of the instant case because of one key common element: the
state entities charged by statute to protect the public interest and the state's ratepayers all sided
with U.S. West - even the Committee of Consumer Services sided with U.S. West — leaving the
ratepayers utterly without an advocate and without counsel. The ratepayers who believed the
stipulation was unconstitutional were left to their own devices. They had to retain private counsel
to represent them because the officials charged by statute to protect the public interest abandoned
it, leaving the public's interest without a voice.
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4. It is clearfromthe Stewart opinion that the Court's majority was incensed that all of
the state's utility regulators had abdicated their statutory regulatory role and had become advocates
for a rate-setting scheme proposed by a utility which was, the Court found, both unlawful and
unconstitutional. Because the state's ratepayers had been left totally on their own, without the
benefit of the State's lawyers whose statutory duty was to enforce the law in their behalf, the Court
invoked the "private attorney general" doctrine in order to relieve the private citizen plaintiffs of
the cost of the attorneys' fees they had incurred to advocate the public interest which the state
wrongfully abdicated.
5. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, explains the equity power of courts: "[I]n the
absence of a statutory or a contractual authorization, a court has inherent equitable power to award
reasonable attorney fees when it deems it appropriate in the interest ofjustice and equity." [Citing
Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5, 93 S.Ct. 1943, 1946, 36 L.Ed.2d 702 (1973).] Discussing the Court's
"inherent power," he states:
Another appropriate circumstance for awarding fees is where a party prevails "as a
'private attorney general' when the 'vindication of a strong or societally important public
policy' takes place and the necessary costs in doing so 'transcend the individual plaintiff's
pecuniary interest to an extent requiring subsidization [citing Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d
25, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315, 326,569 P.2d 1303, 1314 (1977)]."
6. As more fully set out below, the facts of the instant case are identical to those of
Stewart. As in Stewart, it is appropriate, fair, and equitable for the Court to enter an order
awarding plaintiff its attorneys' fees for advocating the public's interest. Moreover, Utah Code
Ann. § 78-33-10 allows the Court to "make such award of costs as may seem equitable and just."
The costs incurred by plaintiff in this action are just and reasonable, and they are set out, along
with plaintiff's attorneys' fees and time, in Exhibit 1, which is attached hereto.
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II. AS IN STEWART, THE COUNTY COMMISSION AND THE CLERK
KNOWINGLY ABDICATED THEIR DUTY TO UPHOLD AND DEFEND THE LAW,
LEAVING THE PUBLIC'S INTEREST UNREPRESENTED.
7. It is beyond question that a fundamental aspect of due process is to have governmental
decisions made by neutral, disinterested officials who uphold and follow established law. In the
2000 general election, the majority had voted to fluoridate the water in Davis County. All sides
had been given an opportunity to be heard and to vote, and the vote for fluoridation having carried
a majority, the Davis County Commissioners and the Davis County Clerk had a duty to implement
and sustain the will of the majority and to uphold the law which was — after November 2000 - to
implement fluoridation.
8. The Davis County Commissioners and the Davis County Clerk completely abdicated
their duty to uphold and defend the will of the majority and the law. At a public meeting of the
Davis County Commission on August 6, 2002, Commissioners and the defendant Clerk refused to
take any action on the "initiative petition" which ultimately became the subject of this lawsuit. By
refusing to take any action whatsoever, the Commissioners and the Clerk utterly abdicated the
authority "public officials" have under well developed Utah case law, when presented with a
petition or referendum for filing, "to reject that petition if, in fact, it is legally insufficient or is
directed to a matter that is not subject to an initiative or referendum." Taylor v. South Jordan City
Recorder, 972 P.2d 423 (Utah 1998), citing Salt Lake on Track v. Salt Lake City, 939 P.2d 680
(Utah 1997) [citations omitted]. See also, White v. Welling, 57 P.2d 703 (Utah 1936); Tobias v.
South Jordan City Recorder, 342 Utah Adv. Rep. 47 (Utah 1998).
9. Indeed, in failing to even consider the legal sufficiency of the proposed "initiative," the
county officials ignored a prior meeting with plaintiffs counsel and Beth Beck and a letter setting
out multiple ways in which the "initiative" was legally infirm and requesting that the Commission
declare the petition to be a referendum filed out of time.
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10. Finally, when the plaintiffs counsel requested an opportunity to explain at the public
hearing the Commission's duty under Utah law to determine the legal sufficiency of the petition
and to reject it if it were found to be an untimely referendum, the Commission Chairman refused to
let him speak.
11. In refusing to determine the legal sufficiency of the "initiative petition" presented to
them, and in turning a blind eye to its infirmities pointed out by plaintiff and plaintiffs counsel, the
Commission and Clerk willfully abdicated their duty to uphold and defend the law and to give
effect to the will of the majority. Rather, the Commission and the Clerk deliberately ignored any
inquiry into whether the "initiative" was, in fact, a legal referendum which should not have been
placed on the ballot. Leaping over this issue, the Commission instead engaged in a lengthy
discussion of "local initiatives" under Utah Code Ann. 20A-7-501(3)(d) which provides that "[i]f
a county legislative body rejects a proposed county ordinance or amendment, or takes no action on
it, the county clerk shall submit it to the voters of the county at the next general election." By
taking no action with regard to the "initiative" — knowing their refusal to act would result in
placing the vote onfluoridationback onto the general election ballot — the Commission and the
Clerk negated the effect of the majority's previous vote and left the public interest with no
representative and no advocate. Not only was the public interest left without representation, but
the County Attorney, who was called upon to defend the Commission's and the Clerk's knowing
abdication, was thereby dragooned into representing the petition sponsors — a small but very vocal
minority who were angry that they had lost fair and square in the previous election vote.
12. It would not have been necessary for the plaintiff to file this lawsuit had the
Commission and the Clerk performed their clear duty under settled Utah case law to vet the legality
of the "initiative." Because they utterly abdicated their duty to do so, they abandoned the
representation of the public interest as expressed by the 52% majority of county voters, and they
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forced the County Attorney to expend public funds to represent the minority who wished to
overturn the established law. Without plaintiffs willingness to bring this lawsuit, the public would
have had no representation at all, their previous vote would have been negated, and the significant
public expenditure in furtherance of fluoridation would have been simply wasted.
III. HERE, THE COUNTY OFFICIALS' ABDICATION OF THEIR DUTY
TO UPHOLD THE LAW AND REPRESENT THE PUBLIC INTEREST
WAS MORE EGREGIOUS THAN IN THE STEWART CASE
BECAUSE THE COMMISSION CHAIRMAN AND THE CLERK
HAD A CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND A PERSONAL STAKE
THAT WAS NEVER DISCLOSED TO THE PUBLIC.
13. In the Stewart case, there was no indication that, in agreeing to stipulated ratemaking,
the governmental decisionmakers in the Public Service Commission or the state agencies involved
were advancing any self-interest or acting out of personal bias. Here, that is not so.
14. As plaintiff discovered by checking records at the County Clerk's office, both the
County Clerk and the Davis County Commission Chairman had signed onto the petition to repeal
fluoridation. Neither the Clerk nor the Commission ever disclosed this fact in any public forum.
More importantly, they failed to disclose during the public meeting on August 6, 2002 that they
themselves had signed onto the petition, and that they personally supported a re-vote and the repeal
of fluoridation. Given Commission Chairman McConkie's failure to disclose that he was a petition
signer, his statements at the meeting to the effect that "We don't want to give anyone cause to say
we are for or against a re-vote," ring hypocritically hollow.
15. Nevertheless, without disclosing their pro-"initiative" bias or the fact that they had
personally signed onto the very petition then before them for their consideration, the Commission
and Clerk rejected any attempt to determine whether the "initiative petition" was legal and valid,
and by dramatically opting to take no action, positively ensured that it advanced to the general
election ballot. By declining to act, they knowingly advanced their own personal cause, and by
failing to determine that the "initiative petition" was, in fact, an illegal, out-of-time referendum,
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they ensured that their personal political views would advance. They did so, most deliberately, at
the expense of the majority of voters in Davis County who did not share their view and whose votes
were thereby negated and whose voice was left without a spokesman. Were it not for plaintiff and
plaintiff's counsel, the public's interest and viewpoint would have been altogether unrepresented.
16. By permitting an illegal petition, which some of them had signed, to advance to the
ballot, the County Commission and the County Clerk forced the County Attorney to defend them if
they were sued. This resulted in the fiill weight of the County's lawyers and the County's financial
and litigation resources to be placed behind the defeated minority who were the authors and signers
of the petition. The public's interest was completely abandoned by the County, just as it had been
in Stewart
17. The County Clerk's and the Commission Chairman's failure to disclose that they were
considering a petition which they themselves had signed (and that by advancing the "initiative" to
the general election ballot without determining its legality they were also advancing their secret
personal bias against fluoridation), demonstrates a lack of good faith that is astounding in public
officials. Waterfluoridationhas been a policy formally adopted by the County's own Board of
Health since 1998. l The voters of Davis County adopted it as the law in November, 2000. The
Health Department issued a mandatoryfluoridationorder on April 5,2001, which was binding on
all water systems and cities in the County, 2 and pursuant to which the County Health Department,
the water system operators, and the County's constituent cities had undertaken great expense and
implementation work.

The Commission Chairman's personal bias and the Commission's displeasure with the pro-fluoridation
position taken by the Board of Health is also demonstrated by the fact that immediately following the 2000
general election, the Commission completely reorganized the Board of Health, even though a majority of
the County's voters approved offluoridation.Only one of the nine members of the Board of Health was
re-appointed by the Commission, and since that reorganization, the Board has had little since to say about
fluoridation, one way or the other.
2
The only city not so bound is Woods Cross, per a previous order of this Court.
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18. By refusing to determine the legality of the "initiative petition'' to repeal fluoride and by advancing to the ballot the "initiative' which the Clerk and the Commission Chairman had
signed but failed to disclose - the Commission and the Clerk placed themselves and the services of
the County Attorney squarely on the side of the defeated minority. The 52% majority, therefor,
had no representation unless they could retain private counsel as in the Stewart case. This plaintiff
found itself the sole advocate for the existing fluoridation law of Davis County, which, rightfully,
should have been upheld and defended by the County Clerk, the County Commission, and the
County Attorney. If the plaintiff had not retained private counsel willing to do the research and
present the case in the short time prior to the ballots being printed, the will of the majority and the
public interest would have been utterly without voice.
IV, THE PLAINTIFF IN THIS CASE CONFERRED A SUBSTANTIAL BENEFIT ON
THE TAXPAYERS OF DAVIS COUNTY BY VINDICATING THE
RIGHTS OF THE MAJORITY WHO VOTED FOR FLUORIDATION
IN THE 2000 GENERAL ELECTION.
19. This plaintiff has conferred a significant benefit on the majority of County voters in
2000, who mandated that water systems befluoridated,by giving their vote a voice and legally
binding effect which the Commission and Clerk cynically had sought to nullify. Not one county
officer charged with enforcing or defending the law of the County would stand with the plaintiff in
the law's defense. The burden of defending the will of the majority, which should by every
reasonable process have been taken up by the County Attorney, was ignored and abandoned by the
County Attorney's primary clients. It is reasonable, equitable, and just, that the plaintiffs
attorneys' fees - incurred in the defense of the legislative act of the majority of voters - be paid by
the County, which should have been on the majority's sidefromthe beginning. If plaintiffs fees
are not awarded, then this action will have produced the odd result that the majority taxpayers
whose interests were vindicated by the litigation will have subsidized all of the legal fees incurred
in the attempt of the losing minority to nullify the 2000 majority vote.
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20. The Stewart Court felt so strongly about officials' abdication of responsibility to act
in the public interest as required by statute, which this case so closely parallels, that it ordered that
the plaintiffs' fees be paid by U.S. West. The Court's holding is directly applicable to the facts of
the fluoridation case:
[P]laintiffs have successfully vindicated an important public policy benefiting all of the
ratepayers in the state. Plaintiffs, a handful of ratepayers, acting entirely on their own,
took on [U.S.West], the Public Service Commission, and the Division of Public Utilities
and have succeeded in having the Commission's rate of return set aside as unlawful,
section 54-4-4.1(2) declared unconstitutional, and the Commission's 'incentive' plan held
invalid. It is significant that the Committee of Consumer Services, which by statute is
charged with the responsibility of representing consumer interests, made no
appearance at all on this appeal and that the Commission and the Division of Public
Utilities have opposed the ratepayers on all issues. The results achieved by the ratepayers
will necessarily benefit all [U.S. West] ratepayers in the state of Utah especially as to
future rates, irrespective of whether a refund of past overcharges might ultimately be
ordered. Here, [U.S. West] has collected rates under a rate of return that is unlawful and
was authorized by the Commission's 'incentive regulation' order to retain revenues in
excess of a reasonable rate of return. But for plaintiffs' action, all that would have been
unchallenged, and none of [U.S. West's] ratepayers would ever have had any relief. In the
absence of a common fund, and under these circumstances, it is appropriate to require the
shareholders of [U.S. West] to pay the cost of plaintiffs' reasonable attorney fees.
Id. at 783-84, emphasis added.
21. Here, but for the timely intervention of this plaintiff, the actions of the Commission
and the Clerk to place a flawed and legally insufficient petition on the ballot would have gone
unchallenged. The mooting of the Utah Constitution and referendum statute by the Commission
and the Clerk would have gone unchallenged. Plaintiff is deserving of a fee award because it
successfully vindicated a policy of broad public significance and importance: the decision of the
52% majority in the 2000 election was held to be a binding legislative act, and the officers of the
County were prevented from subverting it. That vote, which the County officers sought to ignore,
was sustained as the law of the County. The case established a critical precedent for the future by
reminding these County officers that the State referendum statute may not be arbitrarily subverted
to serve the private interests of those elected to office and charged with the law's enforcement.
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DATED this 7th day of November, 2002.

David R. Irvine
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion for Award of
Attorneys' Fees to be mailed this 7th day of November, 2002, via first-class mail, postage prepaid,

Gerald Hess, Esq.
Assistant Davis County Attorney
800 West State Street
Farmington, UT 84025
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Tab 15

David R. Irvine (1621)
255 East 400 South, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
(801) 328-1155
Janet I. Jenson (4226)
JENSON & STAVROS, LLC
255 East 400 South, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
(801) 363-4011
AttorneysforPlaintiff

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

UTAHNS FOR BETTER DENTAL HEALTH DAVIS, INC., a Utah Nonprofit Corporation,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF
DAVID R. IRVINE, JANET L JENSON
and ANDREW W. STAVROS

vs.
DAVIS COUNTY COMMISSION,
Commissioner Dan R. McConkie,
Commissioner Carol R. Page,
Commissioner Michael J. Cragun;
DAVIS COUNTY CLERK,
Steve S. Rawlings,

Civil No.: 020801343
Judge Glen R. Dawson

Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss
)

DAVID R. IRVINE, JANET I. JENSON, and ANDREW W. STAVROS, being first duly
sworn, depose and state as follows:
Mr. Irvine:
I am an attorney licensed to practice in the State of Utah since 1971. I am admitted to

practice before all Utah state and federal courts, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the
United States Supreme Court. I served as a Commissioner on the Utah Public Service
Commission from 1979 to 1985. Since 1985, my practice has been primarily corporate civil and
regulatory representation of independent telephone companies in Utah and Idaho. I have
represented clients before the Federal Communications Commission, the Utah Public Service
Commission, and in litigation in Utah's federal courts. I have litigated for these clients
against US West, AT&T, Sprint, and MCI in matters involving rate claims against these firms
frequently in excess of a million dollars. Other business transactions for which I provide legal
counsel and advice for these clients regularly involve sums several times that a m o u n t My
regular billing rate for the professional services I provide for these clients is $190 per hour.
I was asked by Utahns for Better Dental Health-Davis to represent that entity as
plaintiff in this litigation against several Davis County officers, and I agreed to do so at my
regular billing rate plus associated costs. Because of the somewhat arcane nature of this
litigation and the speed required to prepare and file a complaint before the printing deadline
for the 2002 general election ballot, I recommended that the plaintiff also retain Janet Jenson
and Andy Stavros, whose particular expertise with ballot initiatives is detailed below.
Ms. Jenson:
I have practiced law for more than twenty years in Los Angeles, Washington, D.C.,
and Salt Lake City, Utah. I am a member of the American Health Lawyers Association and
the State Bars of California, Utah and Arizona, and of the United States Supreme Court, where
I was co-counsel in another case arising out of a citizens' initiative in Arizona: Arizonans for
Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43,137 L.Ed. 170,117 S.Ct. 1055 (1997). I am a graduate of
the University of Utah College of Law, where I was a William Leary Scholar and an Editor of
the Utah Law Review for two years. I clerked for Justice Dallin Oaks while he was a Justice of

the Utah Supreme Court, and I have served in Congress as a Chief of Staff for a member of
the U.S. House of Representatives.
I am a founding partner of Jenson & Stavros, PLLC. My law partner, Andrew Stavros,
and I were the authors and proponents of "Initiative B" in the 2000 general election. This
initiative enacted an 80-page statute which created and amended multiple Utah laws
regarding the standards and procedures by which law enforcement agencies and officials
seize and forfeit assets. The "asset forfeiture reform" initiative - called "Initiative B" - was
opposed by a very large number of public officials, including Governor Leavitt, Attorney
General Mark Shurtleff, the Utah Highway Patrol, almost every county attorney and nearly
every law enforcement agency in every county and city. Nevertheless, the voting public
passed Initiative B with a nearly 70% approval vote - the largest margin of any citizen
initiative in the nation in the 2000 general election. To enact that initiative, Mr. Stavros and I
brought and won an appeal before the Utah Supreme Court. I am counsel of record and Mr.
Stavros is the named plaintiff in one of the leading cases on Utah initiative law, Stavros v.
Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel, 15 P.3d 1013 (Utah 2000).
My regular billing rate for the professional legal services I render is $190 per hour, and
that is the fee arrangement upon which I agreed to participate in the preparation and trial of
this case.
Mr. Stavros:
I graduated from the University of Utah College of Law, where I was a William Leary
Scholar, Traynor Moot Court Champion and Region XI National Moot Court Champion. I am
a member of the American Bar Association Health Law Section, and the Utah State Bar. I
clerked with Justice Daniel Stewart on the Utah Supreme Court.
I am the principal author of "Initiative B" - the statewide initiative on asset forfeiture
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reform, which was enacted on the 2000 general election ballot. I was the lead plaintiff, and
Ms. Jenson and I were the attorneys for the plaintiffs in the Utah Supreme Court case, Stavros
v. Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel, 15 P.3d 1013 (Utah 2000). Following the
voters' passage of the forfeiture reform initiative, some law enforcement officials challenged
the constitutionality the new statute in federal district court. I authored the amicus brief on
which the district court relied heavily to reach its favorable decision upholding the
constitutionality of the new statute.
My regular billing rate for the professional legal services I render is $120 per hour, and
that is the fee arrangement upon which I agreed to participate in the preparation and trial of
this case.
As our attached billing summaries indicate, we have expended the following
aggregations of professional time on this case:
David R. Irvine
Janet I. Jenson
Andrew W. Stavros

184.3 hours @ $190/hr
24.0 hours @ $190/hr
43.25 hours @$120/hr
232.40 hours

=
=
=
=

$35,017.00
4,560.00
5,190.00
$44,767.00

Mr. Irvine incurred additional charges as follows:
Copy costs:

$127.15

Filing fee:

$140.00

The total fee requested by plaintiffs counsel is $45,034.15.
Of the time expended, 24.1 hours ($4,579.00) of Mr. Irvine's time, 11.1 hours ($1,332.00)
of Mr. Stavros' time, and 3.25 hours ($617.50) of Ms. Jenson's time were involved in the
preparation of the Court's ruling, revisions to the ruling, and the conferences between counsel
and the Court associated with it. The monetary time value associated with post-hearing
issues (38.45 hours at $6,528.50) represent 16.5% of the total hours expended and 14.6% of the
total dollar value associated with the prosecution of the case. A comprehensive hourly billing
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breakout for each lawyer is attached to this Affidavit, and the attorneys each affirm that the
times and services therein shown are accurately stated.
We prepared the attached billing summaries from the daily time records we maintain.
We account for our time as the work is completed; we do not reconstruct the time later. The
billing rate is consistent with, if not lower than, billing rates of attorneys performing work of
similar complexity and requiring similar experience and skill.
The billing is reasonable and equitable both as to the amounts of time required to
research the applicable law, prepare the pleadings and memoranda, prepare for the hearing,
and prepare the order issued by the Court. The billing is also reasonable as well, with respect
to the result achieved by the litigation. The result achieved by plaintiff was of significant
benefit to the County as a whole, because it validated and secured the votes of the 52%
majority of voters who supported fluoridating the water systems. Otherwise, that 2000 vote
would have meant nothing. Moreover, because the County Attorney represented the
minority who wanted to repeal the fluoridation vote by placing it back on the ballot this year,
the majority of Davis County voters would have had no advocate at all in this proceeding and
no voice before this court without our representation of them as counsel for the plaintiff.
DATED this 30* day of October, 2002.

o^-* • ^V/c« /~~~~
David R. Irvine

- ^

Andrew W. Stavros
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me, a Notary Public, this 30th day of October, 2002.
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UTAHNS FOR BETTER DENTAL HEALTH ~ DAVIS
Attorney's Fees for David R. Irvine
July 19,2002 (3.9 hrs)
• Research initiative petition case law; copy charges $15.00.
July 25,2002 (1.8 hrs)
• Research initiative petition case law; copy charges $5.00.
July 26,2002 (5.2 hrs)
• Draft letter to Davis County Attorney summarizing applicable case law and
requesting that the initiative petition be declared legally insufficient by the County
Commission.
July 27,2002 (4.0 hrs)
• Revise County Attorney letter.
July 28,2002 (7.3 hrs)
• Revise County Attorney letter.
July 31,2002 (1.0 hrs)
• Meet with County Attorney re letter summarizing applicable case law and
plaintiffs request that the Commission reject the petition as being legally
insufficient.
August 6,2002 (4.8 hrs)
• Attend County Commission meeting at which fluoridation petition was to be
considered for action by the Commission; research private attorney general case
law; draft plaintiffs complaint.
August 7,2002 (9.8 hrs)
• Draft plaintiffs complaint.
August 12,2002 (3.0 hrs)
• Initiative petition case law research; revise complaint draft; meet with Janet Jenson
and Andy Stavros regarding litigation strategy, analysis of issues to be raised, and
division of litigation responsibilities.
August 13,2002 (2.0 hrs)
• Revise complaint draft.
August 14,2002 (4.5 hrs)
• Revise complaint; research initiative and referendum cases. Copy charges, $5.00.
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August 15,2002 (3.3 hrs)
• Revise and file plaintiffs complaint. Filing fee, $140.00; copy charges, $4.70.
August 16,2002 (7.5 hrs)
• Case research; draft motion for preliminary injunction; draft memorandum in
support of motion for preliminary injunction.
August 17,2002 (5.5 hrs)
• Draft memorandum in support of motion for preliminary injimction.
August 18,2002 (6.0 hrs)
• Draft memorandum in support of motion for preliminary injimction; draft ex parte
motion and memorandum for leave to file overlength memorandum; draft order
granting approval to file overlength memorandum.
August 19,2002 (4.4 hrs)
• Revise memorandum in support of preliminary injimction.
August 20,2002 (2.5 hrs)
• Revise and file motion for preliminary injunction and memorandum in support.
Copy charges, $47.07.
August 21,2002 (2.0 hrs)
• Research standing case law; copy charges $7.50.
August 22,2002 (1.2 hrs)
• Draft letter to Judge Dawson requesting accelerated hearing.
August 24,2002 (5.8 hrs)
• Re-draft Beth Beck affidavit; research case law re standing; copy charges, $8.00.
August 25,2002 (5.3 hrs)
• Draft memorandum in opposition to motion to dismiss; research case law re
standing; copy charges, $4.00.
August 26,2002 (3.0 hrs)
• Revise Beth Beck affidavit; review and analysis of defendant's answer and motion
to dismiss.
August 28,2002 (4.0 hrs)
• Research case law re forms of legislation; draft rebuttal memorandum in support of
motion for preliminary injunction; copy charges, $11.50.
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August 29,2002 (5.0 hrs)
• Draft rebuttal memorandum in support of motion for preliminary injunction;
revise memorandum in opposition to defendants' motion to dismiss; revise Beth
Beck affidavit; file memorandum and affidavit in opposition to defendants' motion
to dismiss; copy charges, $10.39.
August 30,2002 (6.5 hrs)
• Draft rebuttal memorandum in support of motion for preliminary injunction.
August 31,2002 (2.1 hrs)
• Revise rebuttal memorandum in support of motion for preliminary injunction;
copy charges, $5.00.
September 3,2002 (5.1 hrs)
• Research petition signing status of county officers; draft letter requesting
information to County Clerk; revise rebuttal memorandum in support of motion
for preliminary injunction and file with court; copy charges $6.00.
September 4,2002 (5.8 hrs)
• Research initiative constitutional issues; copy charges, $35.46.
September 9,2002 (6.0 hrs)
• Confer with John Fellows (Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel)
regarding legislative history of UCA § 19-4-111; preparation of hearing exhibits.
September 10,2002 (4.8 hrs)
• Research legislative history of UCA § 19-4-111; confer w/Beth Beck re cases status;
conference call with Judge Dawson, Jerry Hess.
September 11,2002 (5.3 hrs)
• Re-draft Lewis Garrett affidavit; prepare hearing exhibits; review legislative floor
debate tapes covering amendments to UCA § 19-4-111.
September 12,2002 (5.9 hrs)
• Hearing preparation; case organization; copy charges, $4.10.
September 13,2002 (7.5 hrs)
• Hearing preparation; copy charges $5.50.
September 13,2002 (3.5 hrs)
• Hearing on motion for preliminary injunction, motion to dismiss.
September 22,2002 (1.0 hrs)
• Review draft order; draft transmittal letter to Judge Dawson, County Attorney.
September 23,2002 (0.8 hrs)
• Revise draft order, deliver to Judge Dawson, County Attorney.
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September 25,2002 (1.5 his)
• Confer with County Attorney re draft order.
September 26,2002 (6.5 hrs)
• Revise draft order.
September 27,2002 (1.0 hrs)
• Revise draft order; draft change letter to County Attorney.
September 30,2002 (0.8 hrs)
• Conference call with Judge Dawson, County Attorney re order revisions.
October 2,2002 (7.4 hrs)
• Review letter from County Attorney to Judge Dawson; review draft order; confer
with Janet Jenson re requested order changes; draft letter to County Attorney.
Revise draft order.
October 4,2002 (5.1 hrs)
• Conference call with Judge Dawson and County Attorney re draft order; revise
draft order; draft letters to Judge Dawson, County Attorney; deliver order for
signature.
October 9,2002 (4.7 hrs)
•

Research and draft motion and memorandum for award of attorneys' fees.
Total hours billed: 184.3 @ $190/hr

$35,017.00

Copy charges

127.15

Filing fee

140.00
TOTAL FEE
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$35,284.15

UTAHNS FOR BETTER DENTAL HEALTH - DAVIS
Attorney's Fees for Andrew W. Stavros, JENSON & STAVROS, LLC
August 9,2002 (4.20 hrs)
Telephone call with David Irvine re initiative challenge; review letter sent to
County Attorney concerning legality of allowing initiative to be placed on ballot.
Research re applicable Utah law governing initiatives and referenda.
August 12,2002 (5.30 hrs)
Meeting with David Irvine and Janet Jenson re potential causes of action against
Commissioners and Clerk; review proposed complaint and make recommended
changes; research case law re standard for granting temporary restraining order.
August 13,2002 (3.80 hrs)
Draft Motion and Supporting Memorandum for preliminary injunction; review
initiative case law supporting action against Clerk and Commissioners
August 14,2002 (6.50 hrs)
Review draft complaint sent by Mr. Irvine; make proposed changes to complaint
and add relief and remedies section. Continue work on memorandum in support
of motion for preliminary injunction
August 15,2002 (3.70 hrs)
Make final changes to memorandum in support of motion for preliminary
injunction; telephone call with Mr. Irvine re the same.
August 19,2002 (1.90 hrs)
Review final draft of memorandum in support of motion to dismiss; send
suggested changes and comments to Mr. Irvine
September 12, 2002 (4.75 hrs)
Review Defendants' memorandum in opposition to motion for preliminary
injunction and supporting memoranda; meeting with Mr. Irvine and Ms. Jenson re
preparation for hearing on preliminary injunction.
September 13, 2002 (2.00 hrs)
Attend hearing on preliminary injunction
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September 17,2002 (2.50 hrs)
Review tapefromSeptember 16,2002 telephone conference outlining Judge
Dawson's decision. Beginning drafting order consistent with decision.
September 18,2002 (6.30 hrs)
Draft memorandum decision and order.
September 19,2002 (2.30 hrs)
Makefinaledits to memorandum decision and order; add section outlining legal
conclusions supporting permanent injunction.
Total hours billed: 43.25 @ $120/hr
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$ 5,190.00

UTAHNS FOR BETTER DENTAL HEALTH - JANET I. JENSON TIME

8/12/02

1.3 hrs

Meeting with David Irvine and Andrew Stavros regarding motion
for permanent injunction on flouride ballot issue.

8/19/02

3.1 hrs

Reviewing and revising draft compliaint and motion in support of
complaint for preliminary injunction. Telephone conference with
David Irvine regarding suggested changes.

8/23/02

.75 hrs

Reviewing Defendants1 answer and motions to dismiss, arguments
on standing, and memoranda in support of motions. Telephone
conference with David Irvine regarding defendants' motions and
arguments and possible responses.

8/27/02

5.25 hrs

Reviewing and revising draft responses by plaintiffs to defendants'
motions and memoranda in support of motion.

8/29/02

.2 hrs

8/30/02

.75 hrs

9/3/02

5.25 hrs

Reviewing and revising draft response to Defendants' motion and
memorandum in opposition to preliminary injunction.

9/12/02

2.0 hrs

Preparation for oral arguments; "moot" trial on preliminary

Telephone conference with David Irvine regarding revisions to
motion on standing.
Work with David Irvine regarding arguments on bases for
preliminary injunction.

injunction.
9/13/02

2.50 hrs

9/17/02

.3 hrs

9/18/02

2.25 hrs

9/20/02

.2 hrs

Attendance at hearing on preliminary injunction.
Conference call with Judge Dawson and opposing counsel
regarding how Judge prefers order be drafted.
Revising draft order; conferences with A.W. Stavros regarding
draft.
Telephone conference with David Irvine regarding draft order as
sent to Judge Dawson and opposing counsel.
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9/23/02

.2 hrs

Telephone conference with David Irvine regarding changes
requested by opposing counsel in draft order.

9/30/02

.3 hrs

Telephone conference with David Irvine regarding additional
changes requested by opposing counsel in draft order.
Total hours billed: 24.35 @ $190/hr
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$ 4,626.50

Tab 16

17-18-2

716

COUNTIES

(2) (a) Two or more counties, whether or not contiguous,
may unite to create and maintain a state prosecution
district by interlocal agreement pursuant to Title 11,
Chapter 13.
(b) At the time of the creation of the prosecution
district, the participating counties shall be located within
the same judicial district.
(3) The county governing body or bodies shall not dissolve a
prosecution district during the term of office of an elected or
appointed district attorney.
1993

Section
17-19-29.

Monthly report to state treasurer.

17-19-1. County auditor's p o w e r s and duties.
(1) Each person seeking payment from a county on any bill,
account, or charge of any nature, incurred by or on behalf of
the county by any of the county officers or contracted for by the
county executive, shall present the claim to the county auditor.
(2) The county auditor shall:
(a) before the claim is paid:
17-18-2. Legal adviser t o c o m m i s s i o n e r s .
(i) investigate, examine, and inspect each claim;
(1) The county attorney is the legal adviser of the county.
and
(2) The county attorney shall attend meetings of the county
(ii) recommend approval or disapproval of each
legislative body when required.
2002
claim and endorse the recommendation upon the
claim;
17-18-3. R e p e a l e d .
1971
(b) report the claims and his recommendation to the
county executive after the investigation is completed; and
17-18-4. L i c e n s i n g requirement.
(c) keep, in a book kept for t h a t purpose, a complete
No person shall be elected to the office of, or serve as county
record of all claims, his recommendation on the claims,
attorney, without being duly licensed to practice law in the
the reasons for the recommendation, and the action of the
state of Utah.
1957
county legislative body on the claims.
(3) (a) At least annually, the county auditor shall examine
17-18-5. R e q u i r e m e n t s of office.
the books and accounts of the county executive, county
(1) A person filing a declaration of candidacy for the office of
attorney, district attorney, county treasurer, county clerk,
county attorney or district attorney shall:
county recorder, county sheriff, and county surveyor.
(a) be a United States citizen;
(b) At least quarterly, the county auditor shall examine
(b) be an attorney licensed to practice law in Utah who
and reconcile the books and accounts of the county assesis an active member in good standing of the Utah State
sor.
Bar;
(c) At least annually, the county auditor shall examine
(c) be a registered voter in the county or prosecution
the books and accounts of the justice court judges.
district in which he is elected to the office; and
(d) The county auditor may examine the books and
(d) (i) have been, as of the date of the election, a
accounts of all other county offices or administrative units
resident of the county or prosecution district in which
of the county.
h e seeks office for at least one year; or
(e) In a multicounty prosecution district, the county
(ii) have been appointed and, at the time of filing,
auditor specified in the interlocal agreement creating the
be serving as county or district attorney and have
prosecution district may examine the books and accounts
become a resident of the county or prosecution disof the district attorney.
trict within 30 days after appointment to the office.
(4) (a) To fulfill the requirements of this section, each
(2) Each person appointed to the office of county attorney or
county officer, office, or administrative unit shall give the
district attorney shall be:
county auditor complete and free access to all books,
(a) a United States citizen; and
records, and papers.
(b) an attorney licensed to practice law in Utah who is
(b) (i) If the county auditor finds t h a t the books and
an active member in good standing of the Utah State Bar.
accounts of any county officer, office, or administra1997
tive unit are not kept according to law or that
incorrect or improper reports have been made by
CHAPTER 19
those officers, offices, or administrative units, he shall
report his findings to the county executive at their
COUNTY AUDITOR
next regular meeting.
Section
(ii) If the county auditor finds t h a t the records of a
17-19-1.
County auditor's powers and duties.
justice court judge are not kept according to law or
17-19-2.
Repealed.
t h a t incorrect or improper reports have been made by
the justice court judge, the county auditor shall
17-19-3.
Payments — Notification.
provide a copy of his report to the state court admin17-19-4.
Repealed.
istrator, in addition to reporting his findings to the
17-19-5.
Numbering of payments — Payments not precounty executive and county legislative body.
1996
sented for collection.
17-19-6.
Books to show receipts and disbursements.
17-19-2. Repealed.
1996
17-19-7.
Current accounts with treasurer.
17-19-8.
Administration of oaths — Subpoena power.
17-19-3. P a y m e n t s — Notification.
17-19-9.
Books open to inspection.
(1) (a) Subject to Subsection (l)(b), each claim incurred by
17-19-10, 17-19-11. Repealed.
the county and legally examined and allowed and ordered
17-19-12.
Joint statement with treasurer.
paid by the county executive shall, if approved by the
17-19-13.
Seal.
county auditor as to the availability of funds as provided
17-19-14.
Duties — Omnibus provision.
in Section 17-19-1, be paid by:
17-19-15 to 17-19-18. Repealed.
(i) a warrant drawn by the auditor on the county
17-19-19.
Budget officer — Departmental revenue and extreasurer in favor of the person entitled to payment;
penditure reports.
or
17-19-20 to 17-19-27. Repealed.
(ii) a county check or such other payment mecha17-19-28.
Destruction of fee statements, warrants and
nism as may be adopted pursuant to Chapter 36,
claims filed for ten years.
Uniform Fiscal Procedures Act for Counties.

COUNTY CLERK'S nrTTTFQ rm

Section
17-20-1.7.
17-20-2.
17-20-3.
17-20-4.
17-20-5.

Clerk's duties.
Repealed.
County clerk — Record of notaries public.
Duties of county clerk.
Report of election and appointment of officers.

17-20-1. County c l e r k — District court clerk d u t i e s .
The county clerk is t h e clerk of the legislative body of the
county. The clerk shall act as clerk of the district court in
secondary counties of t h e state district court administrative
system and those counties not in the system, and shall
perform the duties listed in Section 78-3-30.
2001
17-20-1.5. C l e r k of c o u n t y legislative body.
The county clerk is the clerk of the county legislative body.
17-20-1.7. Clerk's duties.
The clerk shall:
(1) record all proceedings of the county legislative body;
(2) make full entries of all resolutions and decisions of
the county legislative body on all questions concerning the
county;
(3) record the vote of each member on any question
upon which there is a division;
(4) prepare and certify duplicate lists of all claims,
showing the amount and date of each claim or order and
t h e date of the allowance or rejection of the claim, which
lists shall be countersigned by the county executive;
(5) deliver to and leave with the county auditor one of
the lists referred to in Subsection (4) and deliver to and
leave with the county treasurer the other list;
(6) file and preserve the reports of the county officers to
the county legislative body;
(7) preserve and file all accounts acted upon by the
county legislative body, except such as are necessarily
kept by the auditor;
(8) preserve and file all petitions and applications for
franchises, and record the action of the county legislative
body on them;
(9) authenticate with the clerk's signature and the seal
of the county the proceedings of t h e county legislative
body if the proceedings are ordered published;
(10) authenticate with the clerk's signature and the
seal of the county all ordinances or laws passed by the
county legislative body, and record them at length in the
ordinance book;
(11) record all orders levying taxes;
(12) keep at the clerk's office all county books, records,
and accounts t h a t the clerk is required by law to keep and
keep them open at all times during regular business
hours for public inspection; and
(13) perform all other duties required by law or by any
rule or order of the county legislative body.
2000
17-20-2.

71!

COUNTIES

17-20-1

Repealed.

1989

17-20-3. C o u n t y c l e r k — R e c o r d of n o t a r i e s public.
The county clerk of each county receiving certifications of
lotaries public from the lieutenant governor shall keep and
naintain an indexed record for that purpose, showing the
lames of all persons holding notarial commissions, with the
iates of issuance and expiration.
2003
L7-20-4. D u t i e s of c o u n t y clerk.
A county clerk shall:
(1) issue all marriage licenses and keep a register of
marriages as provided by law;

(2) execute under the clerk's seal and in the name ol
and for the county, all deeds and conveyances of all rea]
estate conveyed by the county;
(3) take and certify acknowledgments and administei
oaths;
(4) keep a fee book as provided by law; and
(5) take charge of and safely keep the seal of the county,
and keep other records and perform other duties as may
be prescribed by law.
2001
17-20-5.

Report of e l e c t i o n a n d a p p o i n t m e n t of officers.
Within ten days after a county clerk issues a certificate oJ
election or a certificate of appointment made to fill vacancies
in elective county offices, the county clerk shall prepare ani
forward to the lieutenant governor a certified report showing
(1) the name of the county;
(2) the name of the county office to which the person'
was elected or appointed;
(3) the date of t h e election or appointment of the
person;
(4) the date of the expiration of the term for which the
person was elected or appointed;
(5) the date of the certificate of election or appointment; and
,
(6) the date of the qualification of the person elected or
appointed.
2000
CHAPTER 21
RECORDER
Section
17-21-1.

Recorder — Document custody responsibility
— Electronic submission procedures and
guidelines.
17-21-2.
Seal.
17-21-3.
Original documents or copies of original documents to be kept by the county.
17-21-4.
Certified copies.
17-21-5.
Receipts for recording of instruments.
17-21-6.
General duties of recorder — Records and
indexes.
17-21-7, 17-21-8. Repealed.
17-21-9.
Indexing of deeds and other instruments.
17-21-10.
Judgments affecting real estate.
17-21-11.
Notice given by recording.
17-21-12.
Recording procedures — Endorsements of entry number required on documents.
17-21-13.
Endorsement of book and page — Return of
instrument.
17-21-14.
Military records — Evidence.
17-21-15.
Repealed.
17-21-16.
Acknowledgments and administrations of
oaths.
17-21-17.
Prohibited acts.
17-21-18.
Fees must be paid in advance.
17-21-18.5.
Pees of county recorder.
17-21-19.
Records open to inspection — Copies.
17-21-20.
Recording required — Recorder may require
tax serial number.
17-21-21.
Ownership plats — Use of geographic information systems or computer systems.
17-21-22.
Annual revision — Reporting changes in ownership to county assessors — Use of geographic information systems or computer
systems.
17-21-23, 17-21-24. Repealed.

Tab 17

20A-7-501

ELECTION CODE

1161

(b) of all those measures approved by the people as law
that the Supreme Court has determined to be in conflict,
proclaim as law the one that received the greatest number
of affirmative votes, regardless of difference in majorities.
1994

20A-7-311. Effective date.
(1) (a) Any proposed law submitted to the people by referendum petition that is approved by the voters at any
election does not take effect until at least five days after
the date of the official proclamation of the vote by the
governor.
(b) Any act or law submitted to the people by referendum t h a t is approved by the voters at any election takes
effect on the date specified in the referendum petition.
(c) If the referendum petition does not specify an effective date, a law approved by the voters at any election
takes effect five days after the date of the official proclamation of the vote by the governor.
(2) (a) The governor may not veto a law adopted by the
people.
(b) The Legislature may amend any laws approved by
the people at any legislative session after the law has
taken effect.
1994
20A-7-312. Misconduct of electors a n d officers — Penalty.
(1) It is unlawful for any person to:
(a) sign any name other t h a n his own to any referendum petition;
(b) knowingly sign his name more than once for the
same measure at one election;
(c) sign a referendum knowing he is not a legal voter; or
(d) knowingly and willfully violate any provision of this
part.
(2) It is unlawful for any person to sign the verification for
a referendum packet knowing that:
(a) he does not meet the residency requirements of
Section 20A-2-105;
(b) he has not witnessed the signatures of those persons whose names appear in the referendum packet; or
(c) one or more persons whose signatures appear in the
referendum packet is either:
(i) not registered to vote in Utah; or
(ii) does not intend to become registered to vote in
Utah.
(3) Any person violating this section is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor.
(4) The attorney general or the county clerk shall prosecute
any violation of this section.
1999

(b) Persons wishing to prepare arguments for and
against initiatives and referenda shall file a request with
the local legislative body at least 45 days before the
election at which the proposed measure is to be voted
upon.
(c) If more t h a n one person or group requests the
opportunity to prepare arguments for or against any
measure, the governing body shall make the final designation according to the following criteria:
(i) sponsors have priority in making the argument
for a measure; and
(ii) members of the local legislative body have
priority over others.
(d) The arguments in favor of the measure shall be
prepared by the sponsors, whether of the local legislative
body or of a voter or voter group, but not more t h a n five
names shall appear as sponsors.
(e) The arguments against the measure shall be prepared by opponents from among the local legislative body,
if any, or from among voters requesting permission of the
local legislative body to prepare these arguments.
(f) The arguments may not exceed 500 words in length.
(g) The arguments supporting and opposing any county
or municipal measure shall be filed with the local clerk
not less than 30 days before the election at which they are
to be voted upon.
(3) (a) In preparing the local voter information pamphlet,
the local legislative body shall:
(i) ensure t h a t the arguments are printed on the
same sheet of paper upon which the proposed measure is also printed;
(ii) ensure that the following statement is printed
on the front cover or the heading of the first page of
the printed arguments:
"The arguments for or against the proposed measure^) are the opinions of the authors.";
(iii) pay for the printing and binding of t h e local
voter information pamphlet; and
(iv) ensure that the local clerk distributes the
pamphlets either by mail or carrier not less than
eight days before the election at which the measures
are to be voted upon,
(b) (i) If the proposed measure exceeds 500 words in
length, the local legislative body may direct the local
clerk to summarize the measure in 500 words or less.
(ii) The summary shall state where a complete
copy of the measure is available for public review.
1994

20A-7-403, 20A-7-404.
20A-7-601.

Renumbered

as

§§ 20A-7-501,
1994

PART 4
LOCAL INITIATIVES AND REFERENDA PROVISIONS

GENERAL

20A-7-401. Limitation — B u d g e t s .
(1) The legal voters of any county, city, or town may not
initiate budgets or changes in budgets.
(2) The legal voters of any county, city, or town may not
require any budget adopted by the local legislative body to be
submitted to the voters.
1994
20A-7-402. Local voter information pamphlet — Cont e n t s — Limitations — Preparation — Statem e n t o n front cover.
(1) The county or municipality t h a t is the subject of an
initiative or referenda shall prepare a local voter information
pamphlet that meets the requirements of this part.
(2) (a) The arguments for and against initiatives and referenda shall conform to the requirements of this section.

PART 5
LOCAL INITIATIVES — PROCEDURES
20A-7-501. Initiatives.
(1) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (b), a person
seeking to have an initiative submitted to a local legislative body or to a vote of the people for approval or rejection
shall obtain legal signatures equal to:
(i) 10% of all the votes cast in the county, city, or
town for all candidates for governor at the last
election at which a governor was elected if t h e total
number of votes exceeds 25,000;
(ii) 12 V2% of all the votes cast in the county, city, or
town for all candidates for governor at the last
election at which a governor was elected if the total
number of votes does not exceed 25,000 but is more
than 10,000;
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(iii) 15% of all the votes cast in the county, city, or 20A-7-502. Local initiative p r o c e s s — Application procedures.
town for all candidates for governor at the last
(1) Persons wishing to circulate an initiative petition shall
election at which a governor was elected if the total
number of votes does not exceed 10,000 but is more file an application with the local clerk.
(2) The application shall contain:
t h a n 2,500;
(a) the name and residence address of at least five
(iv) 20% of all the votes cast in the county, city, or
sponsors of the initiative petition;
town for all candidates for governor at the last
(b) a statement indicating t h a t each of the sponsors:
election at which a governor was elected if the total
(i) is a registered voter; and
number of votes does not exceed 2,500 but is more
(ii) (A) if the initiative seeks to enact a county
t h a n 500;
ordinance, has voted in a regular general election
(v) 25% of all the votes cast in the county, city, or
in Utah within the last three years; or
town for all candidates for governor at the last
(B) if the initiative seeks to enact a municipal
election at which a governor was elected if the total
ordinance, has voted in a regular municipal elecnumber of votes does not exceed 500 but is more t h a n
tion in Utah:
250; and
(I) except as provided in Subsection
(vi) 30% of all the votes cast in the county, city, or
(2)(b)(ii)(B)(II), within the last three years;
town for all candidates for governor at the last
or
election at which a governor was elected if the total
(II) within the last five years, if the sponnumber of votes does not exceed 250.
sor's failure to vote within the last three
(b) In addition to the signature requirements of Subyears is due to the sponsor's residing in a
section (a), a person seeking to have an initiative submitmunicipal district t h a t participates in a muted to a local legislative body or to a vote of the people for
nicipal election every four years;
approval or rejection in a county, city, or town where the
(c) the signature of each of the sponsors, attested to by
local legislative body is elected from council districts shall
a notary public; and
obtain, from each of a majority of council districts, legal
(d) a copy of the proposed law.
1997
signatures equal to the percentages established in Subsection (a).
20A-7-503. Form of i n i t i a t i v e p e t i t i o n s a n d signature
sheets.
(2) If the total number of certified names from each verified
signature sheet equals or exceeds the number of names
(1) (a) Each proposed initiative petition shall be printed in
substantially t h e following form:
required by this section, the clerk or recorder shall deliver the
proposed law to the local legislative body at its next meeting.
"INITIATIVE PETITION To the Honorable
,
(3) (a) The local legislative body shall either adopt or reject
County Clerk/City Recorder/Town Clerk:
the proposed law without change or amendment within 30
We, the undersigned citizens of Utah, respectfully dedays of receipt of the proposed law.
mand that the following proposed law be submitted to: the
legislative body for its approval or rejection at its next
(b) The local legislative body may:
meeting; and the legal voters of the county/city/town, if
(i) adopt the proposed law and refer it to the
the legislative body rejects the proposed law or takes no
people;
action on it.
(ii) adopt the proposed law without referring it to
the people; or
Each signer says:
(iii) reject t h e proposed law.
I have personally signed this petition;
(c) If the local legislative body adopts the proposed law
I am registered to vote in Utah or intend to become
but does not refer it to the people, it is subject to
registered to vote in Utah before the certification of the
petition names by the county clerk; and
referendum as with other local laws.
(d) (i) If a county legislative body rejects a proposed
My residence and post office address are written correctly after my name."
county ordinance or amendment, or takes no action
(b) The sponsors of an initiative shall attach a copy of
on it, the county clerk shall submit it to the voters of
the proposed law to each initiative petition.
the county at the next regular general election.
(2) Each signature sheet shall:
(ii) If a local legislative body rejects a proposed
(a) be printed on sheets of paper 8 V2 inches long and 11
municipal ordinance or amendment, or takes no acinches wide;
tion on it, the municipal recorder or clerk shall
(b) be ruled with a horizontal line 3A inch from the top,
submit it to the voters of the municipality at the next
with the space above that line blank for the purpose oi
municipal general election.
binding;
(e) (i) If the local legislative body rejects the proposed
(c) contain the title of the initiative printed below the
ordinance or amendment, or takes no action on it, the
horizontal line;
local legislative body may adopt a competing local
(d) contain the word ''Warning" printed or typed a t the
law.
top of each signature sheet under the title of the initiative:
(ii) The local legislative body shall prepare and
(e) contain, to the right of the word "Warning," the
adopt the competing local law within the 30 days
following statement printed or typed in not less thar
allowed for its action on the measure proposed by
eight-point, single leaded type:
initiative petition.
"It is a class A misdemeanor for anyone to sign anj
(iii) If the local legislative body adopts a competing
initiative petition with any other name t h a n his own, oi
local law, the clerk or recorder shall submit it to the
knowingly to sign his name more t h a n once for the same
voters of the county or municipality at the same
measure, or to sign an initiative petition when he knows
election at which the initiative proposal is submitted.
he is not a registered voter and knows t h a t he does no1
(f) If conflicting local laws are submitted to the people
intend to become registered to vote before the certificatior
at the same election and two or more of the conflicting
of the petition names by the county clerk.";
measures are approved by the people, then the measure
(f) contain horizontally ruled lines, 3/s inch apart und©
t h a t receives the greatest number of affirmative votes
the
"Warning" statement required by this section;
shall control all conflicts.
1994
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(g) be vertically divided into columns as follows:
(i) the first column shall appear at the extreme left
of the sheet, be 5/s inch wide, be headed with "For
Office Use Only", and be subdivided with a light
vertical line down the middle with the left subdivision entitled "Registered" and the right subdivision
left untitled;
(ii) t h e next column shall be three inches wide,
headed "Registered Voter's Printed Name (must be
legible to be counted)";
(iii) the next column shall be three inches wide,
headed "Signature of Registered Voter*'; and
(iv) the final column shall be 4 % inches wide,
headed "Street Address, City, Zip Code"; and
(h) contain the following statement, printed or typed
upon the back of each sheet:
"Verification
State of Utah, County of _
, hereby state that:
I,
, of _
I am a resident of Utah and am at least 18 years old;
All the names that appear on this sheet were signed by
persons who professed to be the persons whose names
appear in it, and each of them signed his name on it in my
presence;
I believe that each has printed and signed his name and
written his post office address and residence correctly, and
that each signer is registered to vote in Utah or intends to
become registered to vote before the certification of the
petition names by the county clerk.
(3) The forms prescribed in this section are not mandatory,
and, if substantially followed, the initiative petitions are
sufficient, notwithstanding clerical and merely technical errors.
2000
20A-7-504.

C i r c u l a t i o n r e q u i r e m e n t s — Local c l e r k to

20A-7-507

(2) flie sponsors shall ensure that the person in whose
presence each signature sheet was signed.
(a) is at least 18 years old and meets the residency
requirements of Section 20A-2-105; and
(b) verifies each signature sheet by completing the
verification printed on the back of each signature sheet.
(3) (a) (i) Any voter who has signed an initiative petition
may have his signature removed from the petition by
submitting a notarized statement to that effect to the
local clerk.
(ii) In order for the signature to be removed, the
statement must be received by the local clerk before
he delivers the petition to the county clerk to be
certified.
(b) Upon receipt of the statement, the local clerk shall
remove the signature of the person submitting the statement from the initiative petition
(c) No one may remove signatures from an initiative
petition after the petition is submitted to the county clerk
to be certified.
2000
20A-7-506.

Submitting t h e initiative petition — Certi-

fication of signatures by the county clerks —
Transfer to local clerk.
(1) No later than 120 days before any regular general
election, for county initiatives, or municipal general election,
for municipal initiatives, the sponsors shall deliver each
signed and verified initiative packet to the county clerk of the
county in which the packet was circulated
(2) No later than 90 days before anv general election the
county clerk shall
(a) check the names of all persons completing the
verification on the back of each signature sheet to determine whether or not those persons are residents of I Ttah
and are at least 18 years old; and
< b) submit the name of each of those persons who is not
a 1 Ttah resident or who is not at least 18 years old to the
attorney general and county attorney.
(3) No later than 60 days before any general election, the
county clerk shall(a) check all the names of the signers against the
official registers to determine whether or not the signer is
a voter;
(b) certify on the petition whether or not each name is
that of a voter; and
(c) deliver all of the packets to the local clerk
2000

provide sponsors with materials.
(1) In order to obtain the necessary number of signatures
required by this part, the sponsors shall circulate initiative
packets that meet the form requirements of this part.
(2) The local clerk shall furnish to the sponsors:
(a) one copy of the initiative petition; and
(b) one signature sheet.
(3) The sponsors of the petition shall.
(a) arrange and pay for the printing of all additional
copies of the petition and signature sheets; and
(b) ensure that the copies of the petition and signature
sheets meet the form requirements of this section.
(4) (a) The sponsors may prepare the initiative for circula- 20A-7-507. Evaluation by the local clerk.
(1) When each initiative packet is received from a county
tion by creating multiple initiative packets.
(b) The sponsors shall create those packets by binding clerk, the local clerk shall check off from his record the number
a copy of the initiative petition, a copy of the proposed law, of each initiative packet filed.
(2) (a) After all of the initiative packets have been received
and no more than 50 signature sheets together at the top
by the local clerk, the local clerk shall count the number of
in such a way that the packets may be conveniently
the names certified by the county clerk that appear on
opened for signing.
each verified signature sheet.
(c) The sponsors need not attach a uniform number of
(b) If the total number of certified names from each
signature sheets to each initiative packet.
verified signature sheet equals or exceeds the number of
(5) (a) After the sponsors have prepared sufficient initianames required by Section 20A-7-501, the local clerk shall
tive packets, they shall return them to the local clerk.
mark upon the front of the petition the word "sufficient."
(b) The local clerk shall:
(c) If the total number of certified names from each
(i) number each of the initiative packets and reverified signature sheet does not equal or exceed the
turn them to the sponsors within five working days,
number of names required by Section 20A-7-501, the local
and
clerk shall mark upon the front of the petition the word
(ii) keep a record of the numbers assigned < o each
"insufficient."
packet.
2000
(d) The local clerk shall immediately notify any one of
20A-7-505. Obtaining signatures —• Verification « Rethe sponsors of his finding
moval of signature.
(3) If the local clerk finds the total number of certified
(1) Any Utah voter may sign a local initiative petition if the signatures from each verified signature sheet to be insuffivoter is a legal voter and resides in the local jurisdiction.
cient, any sponsor may file a written demand with the local
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clerk for a recount of the signatures appearing on ihe initiative petition in the presence of any sponsor.
(4) (a) Once a petition is declared insufficient, the sponsors
may not submit additional signatures to qualify the
petition for the pending election.
(b) If the petition is declared insufficient, the petition
sponsors may submit additional signatures to qualify the
petition for:
(i) the next regular general election following the
pending regular general election if the petition was a
county initiative petition; or
(ii) the next municipal general election if the petition was a municipal initiative petition.
(5) (a) If the local clerk refuses to accept and file any
initiative petition, any voter may apply to the supreme
court for an extraordinary writ to compel him to do so
within ten days after the refusal.
(b) If the supreme court determines t h a t the initiative
petition is legally sufficient, the local clerk shall file it,
with a verified copy of the judgment attached to it, as of
the date on which it was originally offered for filing in his
office.
(c) If the supreme court determines t h a t any petition
filed is not legally sufficient, the supreme court may
enjoin the local clerk and all other officers from certifying
or printing the ballot title and numbers of that measure
on the official ballot for the next election.
2002

V

(c) The local clerk shall print the title v< TURM win
the Supreme Court on t h e official ballot.
20A-7-509. Form of ballot — Manner of voting.
(1) The local clerk shall ensure that the n u m b c i — '
title are printed upon the official ballot with, irr
the right of them, the words "For" and "Against," eacn v
followed by a square in which the elector may indicate 1
vote.
(2) Electors desiring to vote in favor of enacting the
proposed by the initiative petition shall mark the squarjj
following the word "For," and those desiring to vote againsj
enacting the law proposed by the initiative petition shall rr
the square following the word "Against."

20A-7-510. R e t u r n a n d c a n v a s s — Conflicting HI.
s n r e s — L a w effective o n p r o c l a m a t i o n .
(1) The votes on the law proposed by the initiative petition
shall be counted, canvassed, and delivered as provided in Title
20A, Chapter 4, Part 3, Canvassing Returns.
(2) After the local board of canvassers completes its canvass, the local clerk shall certify to the local legislative body
the vote for and against the law proposed by the initiative
petition.
(3) (a) The local legislative body shall immediately issue a
' proclamation that:
(i) gives the total number of votes cast in thi local
jurisdiction for and against each law proposed
20A-7-508. Ballot t i t l e — D u t i e s of l o c a l c l e r k a n d l o c a l
initiative petition; and
attorney.
(ii) declares those laws proposed by an initio
(1) Whenever an initiative petition is declared sufficient for
petition that were approved by majority vote to b
submission to a vote of the people, the local clerk shall deliver
full force and effect as the law of the local jurisdiction
a copy of the petition and the proposed law to the local
.(b) When the local legislative body determines that twc
attorney.
proposed laws, or that parts of two proposed laws afi
(2) (a) The local attorney shall:
proved by the people at the same election are entirely 15c
(i) entitle each county initiative that has qualified
conflict, they shall proclaim t h a t measure to be law tha:
for the ballot "Citizen's County Initiative Number
has received the greatest number of affirmative votes
" and give it a number;
regardless of the difference in the majorities which thosj
(ii) entitle each municipal initiative that has qualmeasures have received.
':
ified for the ballot "Citizen's City (or Town) Initiative
(c) (i) Within ten days after the local legislative body*!
Number
" and give it a number;
proclamation, any qualified voter who signed thi
(hi) prepare a ballot title for the initiative; and
initiative petition proposing the law that is declare*
(iv) return the petition and the ballot title to the
by the local legislative body to be superseded b;
local clerk within 15 days after its receipt.
(b) The ballot title may be distinct from the title of the
another measure approved at the same election ma
proposed law attached to the initiative petition, and shall
apply to the supreme court to review the decision.
express, in not exceeding 100 words, the purpose of the
(ii) The court shall:
-t
measure.
(A) immediately consider the matter and de
(c) The ballot title and the number of the measure as
cide whether or not the proposed laws are i
determined by the local attorney shall be printed on the
conflict; and
official ballot.
(B) within ten days after the matter is submit
(d) In preparing ballot titles, the local attorney shall, to
ted to it for decision, certify its decision to th
the best of his ability, give a true and impartial statement
local legislative body.
of the purpose of the measure.
(4) Within 30 days after its previous proclamation, the loc£
(e) The ballot title may not intentionally be an argu- legislative body shall:
ment, or likely to create prejudice, for or against the
(a) proclaim all those measures approved by the peopj
measure.
as law that the supreme court has determined are not l
(3) Immediately after the local attorney files a copy of the
conflict; and
ballot title with the local clerk, the local clerk shall serve a
(b) of all those measures approved by the people as la^
copy of the ballot title by mail upon any of the sponsors of the
that the supreme court has determined to be in co'nflic
petition.
proclaim as law the one t h a t received the greatest numbe
(4) (a) If the ballot title furnished by the local attorney is
of affirmative votes, regardless of difference in majoritiei
unsatisfactory or does not comply with the requirements
191
of this section, at least three of the sponsors of the petition
may, by motion, appeal the decision of the local attorney to 20A-7-511. Effective d a t e .
the Supreme Court.
(1) (a) Any proposed law submitted to the people by initio
(b) The Supreme Court shall examine the measures
tive petition that is approved by the voters at any electic
and hear arguments, and, in its decision, shall certify to
takes effect on the date specified in the initiative petition
t h e local clerk a ballot title for the measure that fulfills
(b) If the initiative petition does not specify an effectft
t h e intent of this section.
date, a law approved by the voters at any election t a b
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(c) The sponsors need not attach a uniform number of
(c) contain t h e title of the referendum printed below
signature sheets to each referendum packet.
the horizontal line;
(5) (a) After the sponsors have prepared sufficient referen(d) contain t h e word "Warning" printed or typed at the
dum packets, they shall return them to the local clerk,
top of each signature sheet under the title of the referen(b) The local clerk shall:
dum;
(i) number each of the referendum packets and
(e) contain, to the right of the word "Warning," the
return them to the sponsors within five working days;
following statement printed or typed in not less than
and
eight-point, single leaded type:
(ii) keep a record of the numbers assigned to each
"It is a class A misdemeanor for anyone to sign any
packet.
1994
referendum petition with any other name than his own, or
knowingly to sign his name more t h a n once for the same
measure, or to sign a referendum petition when he knows 20A-7-605. Obtaining s i g n a t u r e s — Verification — Rem o v a l of signature.
he is not a registered voter and knows t h a t he does not
(1) Any U t a h voter may sign a local referendum petition if
intend to become registered to vote before the certification
the voter is a legal voter and resides in the local jurisdiction.
of the petition n a m e s by the county clerk.";
(2) The sponsors shall ensure that the person in whose
(f) contain horizontally ruled lines, 3/s inch apart under
presence each signature sheet was signed:
the "Warning" statement required by this section;
(a) is at least 18 years old and meets the residency
(g) be vertically divided into columns as follows:
requirements of Section 20A-2-105; and
(i) t h e first column shall appear at the extreme left
(b) verifies each signature sheet by completing the
of the sheet, be % inch wide, be headed with "For
verification printed on the back of each signature sheet.
Office Use Only," and be subdivided with a light
(3) (a) Any voter who h a s signed a referendum petition
vertical line down the middle;
may have his signature removed from the petition by
(ii) t h e next column shall be three inches wide,
submitting a notarized statement to t h a t effect to the local
headed "Registered Voter's Printed Name (must be
clerk.
legible to be counted)";
(b) Except as provided in Subsection (3)(c), upon re(iii) t h e next column shall be three inches wide,
ceipt of the statement, the local clerk shall remove the
headed "Signature of Registered Voter"; and
signature of the person submitting the statement from
(iv) the final column shall be 4 % inches wide,
the referendum petition.
headed "Street Address, City, Zip Code"; and
(c) A local clerk may not remove signatures from a
(h) contain the following statement, printed or typed
referendum petition after the petition h a s been submitted
upon the back of each sheet:
to the county clerk to be certified.
2000
"Verification
State of U t a h , County of
20A-7-606. Submitting t h e r e f e r e n d u m petition — CerI,
, of
, hereby state that:
tification of s i g n a t u r e s b y t h e c o u n t y clerks —
I am a resident of Utah and am at least 18 years old;
Transfer to local clerk.
All t h e names that appear on this sheet were signed by
(1) No later than 120 days before any regular general
persons who professed to be the persons whose names election for county referenda, or municipal general election foi
appear in it, and each of them signed his name on it in my local referenda, the sponsors shall deliver each signed and
verified referendum packet to the county clerk of the county in
presence;
I believe t h a t each has printed and signed his name and which the packet was circulated.
written his post office address and residence correctly, and
(2) No later t h a n 90 days before any general election, th#
t h a t each signer is registered to vote in U t a h or intends to county clerk shall:
become registered to vote before the certification of the
(a) check the names of all persons completing the.
petition names by the county clerk.
"
verification on the back of each signature sheet to deter-:
(3) The forms prescribed in this section are not mandatory,
mine whether or not those persons are U t a h residents and"
id, if substantially followed, the referendum petitions are
are at least 18 years old; and
>*
fficient, notwithstanding clerical and merely technical er(b) submit the name of each of those persons who is not
rs.
2000
a U t a h resident or who is not at least 18 years old to the,
attorney general and county attorney.
•A-7-604, Circulation r e q u i r e m e n t s — Local clerk t o
(3) No later than 60 days before any general election, the,
provide s p o n s o r s w i t h materials.
county clerk shall:
1) In order to obtain the necessary number of signatures
(a) check all the names of the signers against the^
mired by this part, the sponsors shall circulate referendum
official registers to determine whether or not the signer i^
ikets t h a t meet the form requirements of this part.
a voter;
]
2) The local clerk shall furnish to the sponsors:
(b) certify on the referendum petition whether or not'
(a) five copies of the referendum petition; and
each name is that of a voter; and
(b) five signature sheets.
(c) deliver all of the referendum packets to the loca|
3) The sponsors of the petition shall:
clerk.
200$
(a) arrange and pay for the printing of all additional
copies of the petition and signature sheets; and
20A-7-607. Evaluation b y the local clerk.
q
(b) ensure t h a t the copies of the petition and signature
(1) When each referendum packet is received from a counfo
sheets meet the form requirements of this section.
clerk, the local clerk shall check off from his record the number,
I) (a) The sponsors may prepare the referendum for circu- of each referendum packet filed.
lation by creating multiple referendum packets.
(2) (a) After all of the referendum packets have been rfc£
(b) The sponsors shall create those packets by binding
ceived by the local clerk, the local clerk shall count the
a copy of the referendum petition, a copy of the law t h a t is
number of the names certified by the county clerks that
the subject of the referendum, and no more than 50
appear on each verified signature sheet.
f
signature sheets together at the top in such a way that the
(b) If the total number of certified names from eacj|
packets may be conveniently opened for signing.
verified signature sheet equals or exceeds the number pj
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names required by Section 20A-7-601, the local clerk shall
m a r k upon the front of t h e petition the word "sufficient."
(c) If the total number of certified names from each
verified signature sheet does not equal or exceed the
number of names required by Section 20A-7-601, the local
clerk shall mark upon the front of the petition the word
"insufficient."
(d) The local clerk shall immediately notify any one of
the sponsors of his finding.
(3) If the local clerk finds the total number of certified
signatures from each verified signature sheet to be insufficient, any sponsor may file a written demand with the local
clerk for a recount of t h e signatures appearing on the referendum petition in the presence of any sponsor.
(4) (a) If t h e local clerk refuses to accept and file any
referendum petition, any voter may apply to the Supreme
Court for an extraordinary writ to compel him to do so
within ten days after the refusal.
(b) If the Supreme Court determines t h a t the referendum petition is legally sufficient, the local clerk shall file
it, with a verified copy of the judgment attached to it, as of
the date on which it was originally offered for filing in his
office.
(c) If the Supreme Court determines t h a t any petition
filed is not legally sufficient, the Supreme Court may
enjoin t h e local clerk and all other officers from certifying
or printing the ballot title and numbers of that measure
on the official ballot for the next election.
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20A-7-608. Ballot title — D u t i e s of local clerk a n d local
attorney.
(1) Whenever a referendum petition is declared sufficient
for submission to a vote of the people, the local clerk shall
deliver a copy of the petition and the proposed law to the local
attorney.
(2) (a) The local attorney shall:
(i) entitle each county referendum t h a t has qualified for the ballot "Citizen's County Referendum
Number
" and give it a number;
(ii) entitle each municipal referendum that has
qualified for the ballot "Citizen's City (or Town) Referendum Number
" and give it a number;
(iii) prepare a ballot title for the referendum; and
(iv) return the petition and the ballot title to the
local clerk within 15 days after its receipt.
(b) The ballot title may be distinct from the title of the
law that is the subject of the petition, and shall express, in
not exceeding 100 words, the purpose of the measure.
(c) The ballot title and the number of the measure as
determined by the local attorney shall be printed on the
official ballot.
(d) In preparing ballot titles, the local attorney shall, to
the best of his ability, give a true and impartial statement
of the purpose of the measure.
(e) The ballot title may not intentionally be an argument, or likely to create prejudice, for or against the
measure.
(3) Immediately after the local attorney files a copy of the
ballot title with the local clerk, the local clerk shall serve a
copy of the ballot title by mail upon any of the sponsors of the
petition.
(4) (a) If the ballot title furnished by the local attorney is
unsatisfactory or does not comply with the requirements
of this section, at least three of the sponsors of the petition
may, by motion, appeal the decision of the local attorney to
the Supreme Court.
(b) The Supreme Court shall examine the measures
and hear arguments, and, in its decision, shall certify to
the local clerk a ballot title for the measure that fulfills
the intent of this section.
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(c) The local clerk shall print the title verified to hir
the Supreme Court on the official ballot.
20A-7-609. F o r m of ballot — Manner of voting.
(1) The local clerk shall ensure that the number and ba
title are printed upon the official ballot with, immediatel;
the right of them, the words "For" and "Against," each w
followed by a square in which the elector may indicate
vote.
(2) (a) Unless the county legislative body calls a spec
election, t h e county clerk shall ensure that referenda t]
have qualified for the ballot appear on the next regu
general election ballot.
(b) Unless the municipal legislative body calls a spec
election, the municipal recorder or clerk shall ensure tr
referenda t h a t have qualified for the ballot appear on t
next regular municipal election ballot.
(3) Voters desiring to vote in favor of enacting the k
proposed by the referendum petition shall mark the squa
following the word "For," and those desiring to vote again
enacting the law proposed by the referendum petition shE
mark the square following the word "Against."
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20A-7-610. R e t u r n and canvass — Conflicting mei
s u r e s — Law effective on proclamation.
(1) The votes on the law proposed by the referendum
petition shall be counted, canvassed, and delivered as p n
vided in Title 20A, Chapter 4, Part 3, Canvassing Returns.
(2) After t h e local board of canvassers completes its car
vass, the local clerk shall certify to the local legislative bod
the vote for and against the law proposed by the referendurj
petition.
(3) (a) The local legislative body shall immediately issue i
proclamation that:
(i) gives the total number of votes cast in the loca
jurisdiction for and against each law proposed by £
referendum petition; and
(ii) declares those laws proposed by a referendum
petition t h a t were approved by majority vote to be in
full force and effect as the law of the local jurisdiction,
(b) When the local legislative body determines that two
proposed laws, or that parts of two proposed laws approved by the people at the same election are entirely in
conflict, they shall proclaim that measure to be law t h a t
has received the greatest number of affirmative votes,
regardless of the difference in the majorities which those
measures have received.
(4) (a) Within ten days after the local legislative body's
proclamation, any qualified voter who signed the referendum petition proposing the law that is declared by t h e
local legislative body to be superseded by another measure approved at the same election may apply to t h e
Supreme Court to review the decision.
(b) The Supreme Court shall:
(i) immediately consider the matter and decide
whether or not the proposed laws are in conflict; and
(ii) within ten days after the matter is submitted to
it for decision, certify its decision to the local legislative body.
(5) Within 30 days after its previous proclamation, the local
legislative body shall:
(a) proclaim all those measures approved by the people
as law t h a t the Supreme Court has determined are not in
conflict; and
(b) Qf all those measures approved by the people as law
that the Supreme Court has determined to be in conflict,
proclaim as law the one t h a t received the greatest number
of affirmative votes, regardless of difference in majorities.
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